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Students graduating from law schools accredited by the American Bar 
Association (ABA) over the past twelve years have faced a declining entry-level 
legal employment1 market, stagnant or decreased starting salaries, and increased 
tuition debt burdens. While most law schools report strong legal employment 
rates, some schools consistently report very weak employment outcomes. At 
least partly in response to the declining legal employment market, law school 
applications and enrollments have decreased sharply in the past seven years. 
However, some law schools with persistently very weak graduate employment 
outcomes have lowered admission standards to minimize reduction in class 
sizes. In doing so, they almost inevitably exacerbate existing problems because 
their bar passage rates suffer and their graduates’ employment prospects are 
further diminished. 
The perfect storm of increased student debt and diminished employment 
outcomes has drawn a wide range of responses, including two reports from 
1. Throughout this article, “legal employment” and “law jobs” are used interchangeably to 
refer to full-time, long-term, bar-passage-required and J.D. Advantage jobs as defined in the 
Definitions and Instructions that accompany the ABA Employment Questionnaire. 2018 
Employment Questionnaire (for 2017 Graduates) Definitions and Instructions, https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_
the_bar/Questionnaires/2018_eq_definitions_and_instructions.authcheckdam.pdf. As 
discussed in Part V.A-B below, most but not all of these jobs are the types of jobs that a 
typical law school applicant envisions obtaining upon graduating from law school.
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American Bar Association presidential task forces,2 and extensive analysis and 
commentary by a range of legal education observers.3 In 2016, the committee 
to advise the secretary of education on higher education accreditation, 
reacting to media reports about law graduate debt, bar passage, employment 
outcomes, and admission standards, recommended suspending the ABA’s 
authority to accredit new law schools.4 While the secretary ultimately rejected 
the committee’s recommendation and continued the ABA’s accreditation 
authority,5 the committee’s underlying concerns are nevertheless well-founded, 
2. See Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education, American Bar 
Association (June 17, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/2015_june_report_of_the_
aba_task_force_on_the_financing_of_legal_education.authcheckdam.pdf [hereianfter 
Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education]; Report and Recommendations of the American Bar 
Association Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, AmericAnBAr.org (Jan. 2014), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_
and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf.
3. See, e.g., BriAn Z. TAmAnAhA, FAiling lAw SchoolS (2012); Frank McIntyre & Michael 
Simkovic, Timing Law School, 14 J. empiricAl legAl STud. 258 (2017); Jerome M. Organ, 
Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category from 2010 to 2014 with Thoughts on Variable Return on Investment, 
67 J.L.E. 1 (2017); Life After Law School, A Pilot Study Examining Long-Term Outcomes Associated with 
Graduating Law School and the Value of Legal Education, gAllup/AcceSS group (2016), https://
www.accesslex.org/life-after-law-school; Deborah J. Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010? 
Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession, 2015 mich. ST. l. rev. 1043 (2015); 
Sandy Baum, A Framework for Thinking About Law Schools Affordability, AcceSSlex inSTiTuTe 
17 (Dec. 2015), https://www.accesslex.org/a-framework-for-thinking-about-law-school-
affordability; Steven J. Harper, Bankruptcy and Bad Behavior, The Real Moral Hazard: Law Schools 
Exploiting Market Dysfunction, 23 Am. BAnkr. l. inST. l. rev. 347 (2015); 2015 State of Legal 
Education, An in-depth look into law school admissions choices, lAw School TrAnSpArency, http://
lawschooltransparency.com/reform/projects/investigations/2015/ (last visited Feb. 20, 
2017); Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in 
the 21st Century, 41 FlA. ST. u. l. rev. 541 (2014); Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The 
Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. leg. STud. 249 (2014); Deborah J. Merritt, The Job Gap, The 
Money Gap, and The Responsibility of Legal Educators, 41 wASh. u. J. l. & pol’y 1 (2013); Jerome 
M. Organ, Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal Education, 41 wASh. u. J. l. & pol’y 
33 (2013); Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, Joyce S. Sterling, Buyers’ Remorse? An Empirical 
Assessment of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. leg. ed. 211 (2013); Jim Chen, A Degree of 
Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates’ 
Economic Viability, 38 wm. miTchell. l. rev. 1185 (2013); Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American 
Law School, 46 u. mich. J. l. reForm 177 (2012). In addition, there are several blogs that 
are devoted almost exclusively to reporting on, analyzing, and critiquing legal education. 
See, e.g., The lAw School cAFé, www.lawschoolcafe.org; State-Level Employment Projections: High 
Lawyer Replacement, The lAST gen x AmericAn, https://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.
com/; Jerry Organ, Thoughts on Fall 2013 Enrollment and Profile Data Among Law Schools, The legAl 
whiTeBoArd (Mar. 2, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2014/03/
thoughts-on-fall-2013-enrollment-and-profile-data-among-law-schools.html. 
4. Transcript of the June 22, 2016, appearance of ABA representatives before the National 
Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) 164-256 (June 22, 
2016), https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/files/2016/08/naciqi-transcripts-062216-508.pdf. 
5. See Letter dated Sept. 22, 2016 from Emma Vadehra, Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Education, to Barry 
Currier, Managing Director, Accreditation and Legal Education, ABA Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
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and its recommendation might well have been accepted had the committee 
grounded it on the appropriate accrediting agency recognition criteria.6 This 
paper builds on the preexisting analyses by assembling the data and reviewing 
the literature, and then advocating the adoption of a new ABA accreditation 
standard on law graduate employment outcomes. 
The ABA Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions 
to the Bar is recognized by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) as the 
accrediting agency for all programs leading to the J.D. degree.7 Higher 
education accreditors like the ABA play a gatekeeping function; accreditation 
is a prerequisite to participation in Title IV student aid programs, including 
federal student loan programs.8 One of the ED’s key criteria for recognition 
requires accreditors to impose student outcome standards on the programs or 
institutions that they accredit. According to the ED regulation, which is taken 
verbatim from the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA),9 accreditors 
must have “standards [that] effectively address the quality of the institution 
or program [in regard to] [s]uccess with respect to student achievement in 
relation to the institution’s mission.”10 The HEOA provision and ED regulation 
on outcome standards do not require accreditors to impose any particular 
outcome standards, but specifically mention “course completion, State 
licensing examination, and job placement rates” as potentially appropriate 
standards.11 
The requirement that ED-recognized accreditors have student outcome 
standards serves two essential purposes. The first and primary purpose is 
to help ensure that students realize the promise of the degree program.12 
The large majority of law students attend law school with the objective of 
practicing law.13 Indeed, the ABA standards state that the objective of a law 
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_
resolutions/2016_september_doe_letter_re_recognition.authcheckdam.pdf.
6. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(1) (2010), and discussion, infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
7. See Accreditation in the United States, u.S. depArTmenT oF educATion, http://www2.ed.gov/
admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg5.html#NationallyRecognized (last visited May 27, 
2018).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2017).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 495(2)(A) (2017).
10. 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(1).
11. Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 495(2)(A).
12. See 34 C.F.R. 602.16(a)(1) (2010) (requiring that accreditors have standards that “effectively 
address the quality of the institution or program” regarding “success with respect to student 
achievement in relation to the institution’s mission”) (emphasis added).
13. The number of graduates of ABA-accredited law schools who took a bar examination for the 
first time in 2015 equals approximately ninety-three percent of the number of graduates in 
the 2014-2015 academic year. See http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/ (Compilation—All 
Schools Data 2016/dropdown for Bar Passage Rates; and Compilation—All Schools Data 
2015/dropdown for JD Enrollment and Ethnicity (academic year)). While this calculation 
does not yield the precise percentage of Class of 2015 graduates who took a bar exam, 
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school academic program is to prepare students for admission to the bar and 
the practice of law.14 Students who complete law school and seek but do not 
obtain legal employment do not realize the promise of the J.D. program. The 
adoption of a new accreditation standard on employment outcomes would 
directly advance the central objective of the J.D. program by requiring ABA-
accredited law schools to demonstrate that their student outcomes align with 
the objective. The argument for an employment outcome standard is especially 
compelling where the cost of legal education has become so high.
A subsidiary purpose of the HEOA provision and implementing ED 
regulation is to conserve federal tax dollars.15 Higher education institutions 
receive their students’ borrowed Title IV tuition dollars upfront and 
regardless of individual student outcomes, but if large numbers of those 
students are unlikely to repay their student loans because they do not obtain 
suitable employment upon graduation, the institution effectively receives an 
unintended federal taxpayer subsidy. The Title IV loan programs are not grant 
programs.16 
While the ED recognition criteria do not mandate any particular student 
outcome standards, the outcome standards adopted by an accreditor must be 
effective.17 Currently, the ABA has a licensing exam (bar examination) passage 
because some graduates from previous years took the bar for the first time in 2015, and some 
graduates in the Class of 2015 deferred taking the bar to a later year, it clearly confirms that 
the large majority of law students go to law school to become attorneys. See also Linda F. 
Wightman, LSAC National Longitudinal Bar Passage Study, lSAc reSeArch reporT SerieS 6 
(1998), http://www.unc.edu/edp/pdf/NLBPS.pdf (reporting that over ninety-three percent 
of students participating in study who enrolled in law school in 1991 and graduated had 
taken a bar examination).
14. ABA Standard 301(a) is the overarching standard on academic program. It provides: 
 Standard 301. Objectives of Program of Legal Education. A law school shall maintain a 
rigorous program of legal education that prepares its students, upon graduation, for admission 
to the bar and for effective, ethical, and responsible participation as members of the legal 
profession. ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2017-2018, ABA SecTion 
oF legAl educATion And AdmiSSionS To The BAr 15 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2017-2018ABAStandar
dsforApprovalofLawSchools/2017_2018_aba_standards_rules_approval_law_schools_
final.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Standards].  
15. See, e.g., Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges and Universities v. Duncan, 640 Fed. App’x 5, 8 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), aff’g 110 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D.D.C. 2015) (upholding ED’s gainful employment rule, 
which conditions access to Title IV student aid programs by proprietary and post-secondary 
vocational schools on graduates of the institution achieving a specified minimum ratio of 
student loan debt to income).
16. Id. at 8.
17. 34 CFR § 602.16 (“The agency’s accreditation standards [must] effectively address the quality 
of the institution or program . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
1039
standard18 and the equivalent of a minimum course completion rate standard.19 
While the ABA requires schools to collect and report detailed graduate 
employment outcome information,20 the accreditation standards currently do 
not address employment outcomes. 
Under current standards, however, there is a small but not insignificant 
group of schools that consistently report very weak graduate employment 
outcomes at nine to ten months after graduation. For these schools, it appears 
likely that a large proportion of graduates may not realize the promise of the 
degree program and, further, that the schools are receiving a significant federal 
taxpayer subsidy. Moreover, most of the schools in this group have responded 
to the decline in law school applications over the past seven years by enrolling 
more students with markedly lower scores on the Law School Admission 
Test (LSAT), leading to lower bar examination passage rates and worsening 
employment prospects for their graduates.21 In addition, most of the same 
schools with weak employment outcomes and large declines in entering class 
credentials also report comparatively high average student debt amounts. 
As a starting point for discussion, this article proposes a draft ABA 
employment outcome standard. Under this draft, a school would be required 
to demonstrate that, for two or more of the past five graduating classes, at least 
sixty percent of its graduates had full-time (FT), long-term (LT), bar passage-
required (BPR) or J.D. Advantage (JDA) jobs at ten months after graduation. 
It further provides that in lieu of complying with the sixty percent requirement 
at ten months after graduation for a given graduating class, a school may 
18. Standard 316, ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 24. The Council of the ABA Section of Legal 
Education has preliminarily approved a revised Standard 316. The revisions to the standard 
and the status of its final approval are discussed infra notes 108-111, and accompanying text.
19. Standard 501(b) (providing that “[a] law school shall admit only applicants who appear 
capable of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education and being admitted 
to the bar) and Interpretation 501-3 (providing that “[a] school having a cumulative non-
transfer attrition rate above 20 percent” is presumptively not in compliance with Standard 
501(b)). ABA Standards, supra note 14.
20. Standard 509(b)(7), ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 35 (requiring law schools to disclose their 
graduate employment outcomes in the form and manner prescribed by the ABA). 
21. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (examining admissions policies, and bar passage 
and employment outcomes at schools with persistently weak employment outcomes). LSAT 
score helps to predict first-year law school grade point average, and first-year law school 
grade point average generally predicts bar passage. Thus, lower LSAT scores are likely to 
result in lower bar passage rates and by extension lower legal employment rates. See Linda F. 
Wightman, supra note 13, at 77; Debra Cassens Weiss, Multistate bar exam scores drop to lowest point 
ever; is there a link to low-end LSAT scores?, ABA JournAl (April 12, 2017), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/multistate_bar_exam_scores_drop_to_lowest_point_ever_are_low_
end_lsat_score (reporting that the average score on the MBE in February 2017 was the 
lowest since the exam was first administered in 1972; and quoting Erica Moeser, president of 
the NCBE, regarding the cause: “decisions on who to admit”).
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comply with the standard by demonstrating that at least seventy-five percent 
of the class was employed in FT, LT, BPR or JDA jobs at twenty-two months 
after graduation.22 An employment outcome standard could be adopted in 
addition to or in lieu of the existing bar passage standard.
Part II of the article frames the problem for which an employment rate 
standard is a proposed solution. It describes: the gap between the numbers of 
law graduates and the numbers of law jobs available to those graduates within 
nine to ten months of graduation for the graduating classes of 2001 through 
2017; the extreme range of legal employment rates across ABA-accredited 
schools; the high cost of legal education and amounts borrowed by students 
to obtain the law degree; the range in average amounts borrowed by students 
across schools; and the admission policies at the schools with persistently 
very weak legal employment rates.23 Part III makes the case for adopting an 
ABA employment outcome standard, and considers arguments against such 
a standard. Part IV briefly reports on the other ED-recognized accrediting 
agencies that have adopted employment rate standards. Part V considers what 
jobs should be considered “law jobs” for purposes of an employment rate 
accreditation standard and lays out several guiding principles for a proposed 
standard. Part VI presents the draft proposed employment rate standard as a 
starting point for discussion. Part VII is a brief conclusion.
II. Defining the Problem: Persistently Weak Graduate Employment 
Outcomes at Some Law Schools, and High Levels of Law School Debt
A. The Data on Law Graduate Employment Outcomes
1. The Numbers of Law School Graduates Versus  
the Numbers of Entry-Level Law Jobs24
As reported in Table 125 below, the number of ABA-accredited law school 
graduates has exceeded the number of entry-level FT, LT, BPR jobs by more 
22. See infra Part VI (laying out tentative draft employment outcomes standard, with additional 
details).
23. “Schools with persistently very weak employment outcomes” is used throughout the article 
to refer to the schools, numbering twenty, that have reported less than forty-five percent 
of graduates in FT, LT, BPR jobs for the Class of 2013 and the Class of 2017. See infra notes 
31-32, and accompanying text (defining “schools with persistently very weak employment 
outcomes”). 
24. NALP changed its data collection methods in 2001, so that it is not possible to reliably 
compare the pre-2001 data with the post-2000 data. The seventeen-year period from the 
Class of 2001 to date is sufficiently long to encompass several economic cycles and to assess 
trends in the market on law graduate employment and rates and compensation. See Deborah 
Jones Merritt, The Job Gap, the Money Gap, and the Responsibility of Legal Educators, 41 wASh. u. J. l. 
& pol’y 1, 6-16 (2013) (discussing the gap between the number of graduates and the number 
of BPR jobs for the ABA-approved law school graduating classes of 2007 to 2011).
25. The data reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 come from both NALP and the ABA. The 
NALP data are for the classes of 2001 through 2010. NALP Class of 2001 Summary 
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than 30% in every year since 2001, ranging from a low of 30.7% (Class of 2001) 
Findings, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/43_erss01sum.pdf; NALP Class of 2002 Summary 
Findings, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/44_summaryfindings2002.pdf; NALP Class 
of 2003 Summary Findings, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/45_ersini03.pdf; NALP 
Class of 2004 Selected Findings, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/160_selectedfindings04.
pdf; NALP Class of 2005 Selected Findings, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/316_
erssselectedfindings05.pdf; NALP Class of 2006 Selected Findings, http://www.nalp.
org/uploads/768_classof06selectedfindings.pdf; NALP Class of 2007 National Summary 
Report, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/1229_natlsummary07revised.pdf; NALP Class 
of 2008 National Summary Report, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/natlsummary2008.
pdf; NALP Class of 2009 National Summary Report, http://www.nalp.org/uploads/
NatlSummaryChartClassof09.pdf; NALP National Summary Chart for Class of 2010, 
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NationalSummaryChartforSchools2010.pdf. The NALP 
data for the classes of 2001 through 2006 do not break out full-time and part-time jobs, so 
the figures in the table somewhat overstate the numbers and percentages of FT, LT, BPR 
and JDA jobs for those classes. For the Class of 2007, the first class for which NALP broke 
out full-time and part-time jobs, 2.6% of BPR jobs were part time, and 13.5% of JDA jobs 
were part-time. See NALP Class of 2007 National Summary Report, http://www.nalp.org/
uploads/1229_natlsummary07revised.pdf. 
  The ABA data are for the classes of 2011 through 2017, ABA 2012 Law Graduate 
Employment Data, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/law_grad_employment_data.
authcheckdam.pdf (includes Class of 2011 data); ABA 2013 Law Graduate Employment 
Data, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_
and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2013_law_graduate_employment_data.
authcheckdam.pdf; ABA 2014 Law Graduate Employment Data, http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
statistics/2014_law_graduate_employment_data_042915.authcheckdam.pdf; ABA 
2015 Law Graduate Employment Data, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/2015_law_
graduate_employment_data.authcheckdam.pdf; ABA 2016 Law Graduate Employment 
Data, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_
and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_law_graduate_employment_data.
authcheckdam.pdf; ABA 2017 Law Graduate Employment Data, https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
statistics/2017_law_graduate_employment_data.authcheckdam.pdf. The ABA began 
requiring schools to report graduate employment data directly to the ABA in 2010 but did 
not start collecting data on whether jobs were BPR, JDA, professional, or nonprofessional 
until the Class of 2011. The ABA changed the NALP category of J.D. Preferred to J.D. 
Advantage. All schools’ reported employment data are published each year on the ABA 
website at http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org. Before 2010, schools reported 
their data to NALP and provided the ABA with summaries of those data. 
  The percentages of graduates reported as employed in the Table 1 were calculated 
using total number of graduates in a class, not graduates whose employment status was 
known, as the denominator. (The source of the numbers of graduates for the classes of 2001 
to 2010 in Table 1 is: J.D and LL.B Degrees Awarded, 1981-2011, http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
statistics/jd_llb_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf. The source of the numbers of 
graduates for the classes of 2011 to 2017 is in the ABA Law Graduate Employment Data cited 
immediately above). In effect, the calculations assume that graduates whose employment 
status was unknown did not have FT, LT, BPR or JDA jobs. The percentage of graduates 
whose employment status was known increased from 91.8% to 98.5% between 2001 and 2017. 
See the NALP reports and the ABA 2017 Law Graduate Employment Data cited above 
in this footnote. Graduates who do not report their employment status to their school 
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to a high of 45.1% (Class of 2011). The average excess is almost 37%. Figure 1 
below graphically illustrates the gap between the numbers of graduates and 
FT, LT, BPR jobs for those graduates over the seventeen-year period.
Table 1 also shows that both the percentage and the absolute number of law 
school graduates employed in FT, LT, BPR jobs within nine to ten months 
after graduation has declined since at least 2001. There has been a drop of 
approximately 3 points in the percentage of graduates employed in FT, LT, 
BPR jobs, and a decrease of nearly 8% in the number of graduates employed 
in such jobs, over the past seventeen years. The percentage of graduates in 
FT, LT, BPR jobs has gradually increased for the classes of 2012 to 2017 as 
graduating class sizes have decreased. After increasing somewhat in 2012 and 
2013 after the end of the Great Recession, the number of FT, LT, BPR jobs 
inched lower in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and remained essentially flat for the Class 
of 2017.
The decline in the number and percentage of law graduates employed in 
FT, LT, BPR positions over the past seventeen years has been substantially 
offset by an increase in the number and percentage of law school graduates 
employed in FT, LT, JDA jobs. Counting JDA positions as law jobs somewhat 
reduces the oversupply of law graduates compared with law jobs, but the 
difference is still quite large. The number of graduates has exceeded the 
number of entry-level FT, LT, BPR and JDA jobs combined by more than 
25% for every class except two since 2001, ranging from a low of 23.7% (Class 
of 2007) to a high of 37.0% (Class of 2011). The average excess is almost 30%. 
Figure 1 also graphically illustrates the gap between the numbers of graduates 
and BPR + JDA jobs for those graduates over the seventeen-year period.
presumably but not necessarily had bad employment outcomes, thus using total graduates 
as the denominator slightly understates the percentages of graduates in FT, LT, BPR and 
JDA jobs. Given the higher percentages of graduates not reporting their status in the earlier 
years between 2001 and 2016, the understatement of FT, LT, BPR and JDA jobs may be 
somewhat higher in those years.
  Beginning with the Class of 2015 Employment Questionnaire, the ABA established law 
school-funded positions as a separate employment category along with BPR, JDA, other 
professional, and nonprofessional. Before the Class of 2015, law school-funded positions 
were reported within the then-existing four categories. For example, if a graduate before the 
Class of 2015 was employed in a FT, LT, BPR job that was law school-funded, the position 
was reported as a FT, LT, BPR job. To facilitate an apples-to-apples comparison of BPR 
and JDA jobs between the classes of 2015 through 2017 and the classes of 2012 through 2014, 
I have backed out the numbers of law school-funded positions. This is possible because 
schools separately reported the numbers of law school-funded positions for each of the 
then four employment categories. For the Class of 2011, the ABA collected information on 
whether law school-funded positions were full time or part time and long term or short 
term, but did not collect information on whether the positions were BPR, JDA, etc. There 
were relatively few—476—FT, LT law school-funded positions reported for the Class of 2011. 
However, because it is not known how many were FT, LT, BPR and JDA, it is not possible 
to back them out, and the Class of 2011 figures therefore slightly overstate these employment 
rates. Because there were exceedingly few law school-funded positions before 2011, the 
comparisons should be valid across all of the years reported except as just noted for the 
Class of 2011.
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Table 1. Graduate Employment in FT, LT, BPR and JDA Jobs,  
Classes of 2001-2017
Graduating 
Class FT, LT BPR FT, LT JDA
Combined FT, LT, 
BPR, JDA
Class 
Year Total Total Percent Total Percent Number Percent
2001 37,910 26,279 69.3% 2,058 5.4% 28,337 74.7%
2002 38,606 26,564 68.8% 1,836 4.8% 28,400 73.6%
2003 38,875 26,387 67.9% 2,340 6.0% 28,727 73.9%
2004 40,024 26,939 67.3% 2,756 6.9% 29,695 74.2%
2005 42,672 28,932 67.8% 2,924 6.9% 31,856 74.7%
2006 43,883 30,273 69.0% 3,194 7.3% 33,467 76.3%
2007 43,518 29,978 68.9% 2,635 6.1% 32,613 74.9%
2008 43,588 28,890 66.3% 2,513 5.8% 31,403 72.0%
2009 44,004 26,625 60.5% 2,594 5.9% 29,219 66.4%
2010 44,258 25,654 58.0% 3,170 7.2% 28,824 65.1%
2011 43,979 24,149 54.9% 3,556 8.1% 27,705 63.0%
2012 46,364 25,545 55.1% 4,246 9.2% 29,791 64.3%
2013 46,776 25,878 55.3% 4,581 9.8% 30,459 65.1%
2014 43,832 25,417 58.0% 4,815 11.0% 30,232 69.0%
2015 39,984 23,687 59.2% 4,342 10.9% 28,029 70.1%
2016 37,124 22,930 61.8% 3,993 10.8% 26,923 72.5%
2017 34,922 23,114 66.2% 3,179 9.1% 26,293 75.3%
2001-
2016 (-2,988) (-3,165) (-3.1 pts.) +1,121 +3.7 pts. (-3,044) +0.6 pts.
Figure 1. Percentages of Law Graduates Employed in FT, LT BPR and 
JDA Jobs, Classes of 2001-2017
J.D.s and Jobs
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2. Law Graduate Salaries
The oversupply of law graduates compared with law jobs over the past 
seventeen years has been accompanied by deflation and stagnation in entry-
level law graduate salaries. NALP collects salary information on full-time jobs 
as part of its annual employment survey. For the Class of 2016 (the most recent 
for which salary information is available), a little more than half of graduates 
reported their salaries.26 Graduates with higher salaries are more likely than 
graduates with lower salaries to report their salaries, so NALP statistically 
adjusts its reported means downward to take account of the reporting bias.27 
Even if there is some question about just how accurate the salary figures are, it 
appears that the reporting methodology has been consistent over the years so 
that the changes over time are reasonably accurately captured.
Table 2 below reports the NALP data on graduate salaries, adjusted for 
inflation based on 2016 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).28 The blank cells reflect the omission of those numbers 
in the data published by NALP on its website. As reported in the table, 
starting salaries have declined in real terms between 2001 and 2016 and have 
been essentially flat since 2011, with modest increases across the board for the 
classes of 2015 and 2016. The median salary has decreased by 13% between 
2001 and 2016, and by 19% between 2009 and 2016, in inflation-adjusted 
dollars. The picture is similar for private practice and government salaries. 
The median private practice salary has decreased by 14% since 2001, and by 
29% between 2009 and 2016. Government salaries appear to have fallen from 
their prerecession high of just over $66,000 for the Class of 2007 to less than 
$59,000 for the Class of 2016.29 
There has been a modest uptick in entry-level law graduate pay since 
2014. The median law firm starting salary increased by 8.6% and the median 
government starting salary increased by 11.1% from the Class of 2014 to the 
Class of 2016. However, the overall median starting salary increased by only 
2.4%. Big Law (firms of more than 100 lawyers) increased entry-level salaries 
26. See Class of 2016 National Summary Report, NALP (Aug. 2017), https://www.nalp.org/uploads/
Classof2016_NationalSummaryReport.pdf (reporting that approximately 19,900 of 37,124, 
or about fifty-four percent, of graduates in the Class of 2016 reported salaries).
27. See, e.g., Class of 2014 Bimodal Salary Curve, NALP (Aug. 2015), http://www.nalp.org/class_
of_2014_salary_curve (reporting mean salary of $82,292 and adjusted mean of $77,382).
28. CPI Inflation Calculator, BureAu oF lABor STATiSTicS, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 
(last visited May 27, 2018). 
29. The median and mean salaries reported in Table 2 above obscure the bimodal distribution 
in entry-level salaries, with salaries grouped on either side of the average and relatively few 
salaries actually at the average. For the graduating Class of 2014, the most recent for which 
NALP has published a report on the distribution of entry-level law graduate salaries, one 
peak in the distribution of salaries occurs in the $45,000-$60,000 range, with about 50.5% 
of graduates earning salaries in that range. The second peak comprises salaries of $160,000, 
garnered by 17% of graduates. See Class of 2014 Bimodal Salary Curve, supra note 27. 
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from $160,000 to $180,000 for the Class of 2016, an increase of 12.5% and the 
first increase in Big Law salaries since 2009 (seven years).30
Table 2. Law Graduate Salaries, Classes of 2001-2016,  
in Inflation-Adjusted 2016 Dollars
All Salaries Private Practice Salaries Gov’t Salaries
Class 
of Median Mean/Adjusted Mean Median Mean Median
2016 $65,000 $90,305/ $104,000 $113,571 $59,000
2015 $65,352 $84,452/ $100,853 $104,987 $55,469
2014 $63,490 $82,941/$78,002 $95,739 $102,794 $53,110
2013 $63,905 $84,297/$80,000 $97,187 $102,302 $53,197
2012 $63,578 $83,879/$78,480 $93,429 $104,641 $53,981
2011 $63,937 $83,758/$78,856 $90,578 $104,431 $55,412
2010 $68,935 $92,022/$84,582 $113,797 $116,471 $56,898
2009 $80,605 $103,675/95,383 $145,538 $129,029 $58,215
2008 $80,296 $102,601/ $139,403 $127,246 $60,072
2007 $125,820 $124,428 $66,041
2001 $74,332 $121,634 $55,411
3. The Range of Legal Employment Rates Across  
ABA-Accredited Law Schools
Law schools report a wide range of legal employment rates. Table 3 below 
reports the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile percentages of Class 
of 2017 graduates at the 203 ABA-accredited law schools employed in FT, LT, 
BPR positions, and FT, LT, BPR and JDA positions combined. Nearly eight 
years after the end of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, at a quarter of all 
ABA-accredited law schools (fifty-one schools), fewer than 56% of graduates 
were employed in LT, FT, BPR jobs, and fewer than 67% were employed in 
LT, FT, BPR and JDA positions combined at ten months after graduation. At 
eleven schools (the fifth percentile), barely more than a third of graduates were 
employed in LT, FT, BPR jobs, and less than half were employed in LT, FT, 
BPR and JDA jobs combined. Even at the 75th percentile (153 schools), nearly 
25% or more of Class of 2017 graduates did not obtain FT, LT, BPR jobs within 
ten months after graduation.
30. See Jobs and JDs, Employment for the Class of 2016 – Selected Findings, NALP (2017), https://www.
nalp.org/uploads/SelectedFindingsClassof2016.pdf (last visited June 7, 2018).
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Table 3. Range of Employment Rates Across Schools,  
Graduating Class of 2017








B. The Response of Schools with Very Weak Graduate Employment Outcomes
More than just a few ABA-accredited law schools have reported persistently 
very weak graduate legal employment rates over the past five years.31 Twenty 
law schools – nearly 10% of all ABA-accredited law schools – reported FT, LT, 
BPR employment rates below 45% for the Class of 2013 and again for the Class 
of 2017, including 10 schools – nearly 5% of ABA-accredited schools – that 
reported FT, LT, BPR employment rates of less than 35% for both classes.32 
(These twenty schools are referred to as “the schools with persistently very 
weak employment outcomes” throughout this article.) 
Most of the twenty schools with persistently very weak graduate 
employment outcomes over the past five years appear to have pursued 
admission policies designed to minimize the reduction in enrollment as 
law school applications have declined rather than to improve graduate 
employment outcomes. Instead of increasing admission requirements to boost 
bar passage and legal employment rates, most have increased acceptance rates 
and markedly reduced admission criteria.33 As reported in Table 4 below, at all 
but four of the twenty schools, the 25th percentile LSAT score has decreased 
from 2011 to 2017, by between 1 and 6 points, with an average decrease of 2.6 
points. At twelve of the schools, the decrease is 3 or more points, and two 
schools posted 6-point declines. (At three schools, there was no change, and 
one school posted a 1-point increase.34)
31. The data reported in this Part (except for the data reported infra note 35 and accompanying 
text) are from the 2010-2017 spreadsheets posted by the ABA under “Compilation-All 
Schools Data,” at http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/. 
32. Fourteen of the twenty schools improved their FT, LT, BPR employment rates between 2013 
and 2017, but only one school’s rate improved by more than the overall national increase of 
10.9 percentage points over the same period. See Tables 4 and 1. Six schools’ FT, LT, BPR 
employment rates actually worsened. See Table 4.
33. Moreover, a decline in quality of the graduates “could be reflected in earnings over the long 
run.” Baum, supra note 3, at 17. 
34. See also 2015 State of Legal Education: An in-depth look into law school admissions choices, lAw School 
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Table 4. 25th Percentile LSAT Scores, Bar Passage Rates, and Average 













































1 39.7 40.7 67.1 49.3 -17.8 148 144 -4 $142,515
2 34.6 39.5 62.6 52.8 -9.8 146 145 -1 $152,476
3 34.6 43.7 61.1 73.0 +11.9 147 148 +1 $131,421
4 32.8 34.1 65.5 51.2 -14.3 150 145 -5 $135,740
5 30.8 40.8 68.4 39.5 -28.9 145 145 -- $160,942
6 22.8 37.9 55.7 48.9 -6.8 150 146 -4 $158,857
7 26.5 8.8 55.6 37.3 -18.3 135 135 -- $139,624
8 40.6 38.2 89.2 58.6 -30.6 149 146 -3 $100,603
9 22.5 30.1 65.6 57.1 -8.5 145 142 -3 $63,300
10 7.5 0.7 32.1 34.7 +2.6 132 131 -1 NR
11 19.8 20.5 53.6 49.4 -4.2 143 139 -4 NR
12 40.0 43.5 73.5 52.8 -20.7 152 150 -2 $147,976
13 23.6 29.0 55.2 29.2 -26.0 148 142 -6 $198,962
14 31.6 34.9 56.4 42.1 -14.3 150 147 -3 $122,628
15 38.4 39.6 76.0 46.6 -29.4 147 147 -- $128,221
16 30.7 26.9 51.5 46.0 -5.5 143 139 -4 $122,395
17 42.6 36.8 64.1 60.2 -3.9 151 146 -5 $125,143
18 43.8 37.4 77.6 58.7 -18.9 149 145 -4 $90,302
19 29.5 26.7 65.7 35.3 -30.4 149 N/A N/A $179,056
20 26.8 26.3 54.7 38.5 -16.2 151 145 -6 $105,330
Avg. -14.5 -2.6 
35
TrAnSpArency, http://lawschooltransparency.com/reform/projects/investigations/2015/ 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (documenting declining entering class admission profiles at some 
law schools and the impact on bar admissions).
35. These figures for average amount borrowed by graduates who borrowed any amount to 
attend law school are from Law School Costs: Debt, lAw School TrAnSpArency, https://data.
lawschooltransparency.com/costs/debt/?scope=schools (last visited May 27, 2018). While 
181 of 203 ABA-accredited law schools reported the average amount borrowed for their 2017 
graduates, only eight of the 20 schools with persistently weak employment outcomes did 
so. Another ten of the schools have reported average graduate debt at least once since 2012. 
Table 4 reports the most recently available figures. For schools 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, 15, 17, and 18, 
the figures are for 2017 graduates. For schools 2, 7, 8, 19, and 20, the figures are for 2016 
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As reflected in Table 5 below, at all but one of the ten schools that reported 
less than 35% of graduates in FT, LT, BPR jobs in 2013 and again in 2017, the 
25th percentile LSAT scores have decreased by between 1 and 6 points. In 
the most extreme case, the school’s 25th percentile LSAT score dropped by 6 
points (from 148 to 142), even as its FT, LT, BPR rates for 2013 and 2017 were 
23.6 and 29.0, respectively. 
Table 5. 25th Percentile LSAT Scores, Bar Passage Rates, and Average 












































4 32.8 34.1 65.5 51.2 -14.3 150 145 -5 $135,740
7 26.5 8.8 55.6 37.3 -18.3 135 135 -- $139,624
9 22.5 30.1 65.6 57.1 -8.5 145 142 -3 $63,300
10 7.5 0.7 32.1 34.7 +2.6 132 131 -1 NR
11 19.8 20.5 53.6 49.4 -4.2 143 139 -4 NR
13 23.6 29.0 55.2 29.2 -26.0 148 142 -6 $198,962
14 31.6 34.9 56.4 42.1 -14.3 150 147 -3 $112,628
16 30.7 26.9 51.5 46.0 -5.5 143 139 -4 $122,395
19 29.5 26.7 65.7 35.3 -30.4 149 N/A N/A $179,056
20 26.8 26.3 54.7 38.5 -16.2 151 145 -6 $105,330
Avg. -13.5 -3.6
Predictably, as admission selectivity has declined, the first-time bar passage 
rates at nearly all of the twenty schools with persistently very weak employment 
outcomes have also declined.36 As further reported in Table 4 above, at eighteen 
of the twenty schools, the first-time bar passage rate fell by between 3.9 and 
30.6 percentage points from 2013 to 2017. The average decrease in first-time bar 
passage rates across the twenty schools was 14.5 percentage points, more than 
twice the 6 percentage-point decline in overall bar passage rates since 2013.37
The declining admissions profiles and first-time bar passage rates at most of 
the twenty schools with persistently very weak employment outcomes over the 
graduates. For school 5, the figure is for 2015 graduates. For schools 1, 12, 14, and 16, the 
figures are for 2012 graduates. The figures from earlier years are not adjusted for inflation.
36. See supra note 21 (discussing the link between LSAT scores and bar passage rates).
37. Bar pass rates nationally declined from 81% in 2013 to 75% in 2017. See infra note 157 (reporting 
national bar pass rates for 2007-2017).
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past five years are reflected in their continuing weak employment outcomes. At 
six of the twenty schools, the FT, LT, BPR employment rate actually decreased 
from 2013 to 2017, compared to an increase of 10.9 percentage points across 
all ABA law schools. Only two of the schools posted gains greater than 10.9 
percentage points.
C. The Cost of Legal Education and Law Graduate Debt
1. Law School Tuition and Law Graduate Debt—The National Picture
Even as the legal employment market has declined over the past two 
decades,38 the cost of legal education has increased markedly. The average 
tuition at private law schools in 2017-2018 was $46,329. At public schools, it was 
$26,425 for in-state tuition.39 Although tuition discount rates are at least 28% 
on average at private schools and 22% at public law schools, approximately 
38% of students at private law schools and 40% of students at public law 
schools pay full tuition.40 
As reported by the ABA Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education in 
2015, “[u]sing the higher education price index (referred to as HEPI), which 
makes an inflation adjustment based on the cost of doing business, private 
law school tuition increased 29% from 1999-2000 to 2014-2015, and public 
law school in-state tuition increased 104%. Using the consumer price index 
(referred to as CPI), which makes an inflation adjustment based on the price 
to the consumer, the increases were 46% and 132%, respectively.”41
With the increases in law school tuition have come increases in law graduate 
debt.42 As reported in Table 6 below, across all law schools, the average amount 
borrowed by Class of 2017 graduates who borrowed money to attend law 
school was nearly $116,000. At private schools, the average was over $130,000, 
38. See supra notes 24-30, and accompanying text. 
39. Law School Costs: Tuition, Law School Transparency, https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/
costs/tuition/ (last visited May 27, 2018). 
40. See Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education, supra note 2, at 7-8. The Task Force Report 
figures are for 2013-2014. The trend has been toward increased tuition discounting. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 7. 
42. Before 2012, the ABA required schools to report the average amount borrowed for law school 
by graduates who borrowed any money for law school. In other words, the calculation of the 
average excluded graduates who did not take out any student loans for law school. The ABA 
stopped collecting that information in 2012, but U.S. News & World Report has continued 
to ask schools to report the figure to it. Instead, the ABA currently requires schools to report 
the average amount borrowed by all students who borrow any money during the previous 
year. The chart relies on the ABA data for the years 2001-2002 to 2011-2012, and on the U.S. 
News data for the years 2011-2012 to 2016-2017. 
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and at public law schools, nearly $93,000.43 As high as these numbers are, 
they somewhat understate actual debt at graduation, as they include only the 
amount borrowed and do not include accrued interest.44 (Also, they are for 
law school debt only, and do not include any amounts borrowed to obtain 
the undergraduate degree.) Law schools do not report 25th, 50th, or 75th 
percentile amounts borrowed. A New America Foundation report published 
in 2014 found that the 75th percentile amount borrowed by students at all 
types of law schools was more than $190,000, with $150,000 of that borrowed 
for law school and $40,000 for undergraduate school.45
Table 6. Average Amount Borrowed, Class of 2017 Graduates46
Type of School Average Debt Per Student
Private $130,142 
Public $92,997 
All $115,852 (with 75.5% of graduates borrowing)
2. Average Amount Borrowed—The Range Across Schools
Of course, the average amount borrowed by students at different law 
schools varies considerably because of variations in tuition, cost of living, and 
perhaps other factors. Table 7 below reports the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 
90th percentile amounts for the Class of 2017.47
43. Law School Costs: Debt, supra note 35 (based on data reported by schools to U.S. News & World 
Report and additional data collected by LST directly from schools). The Task Force on 
the Financing of Legal Education reported that “[p]eriodic surveys of individual students by 
the U.S. Department of Education show that individual law student debt—adjusting for 
inflation—increased by 56% from 2004 to 2012.” Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education, supra 
note 2, at 32.
44. Professor Campos has estimated that, because the reported numbers for average amount 
borrowed do not include interest, they understate law student debt at graduation by close to 
fifteen percent. See Campos, supra note 3, at 205.
45. See Steven J. Harper, Bankruptcy and Bad Behavior The Real Moral Hazard: Law Schools Exploiting 
Market Dysfunction, 23 Am. BAnkr. l. rev. 347, 347 (2015) (citing Jason Delisle, The 
Graduate Student Debt Review: The State of Graduate Student Borrowing, new Am. educ. pol’y 
progrAm 9 (Mar. 2014), http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/
GradStudentDebtReview-Delisle-Final.pdf.).
46. Law School Costs: Debt, supra note 35.
47. Calculations are based on data published by Law School Transparency at https://data.
lawschooltransparency.com/costs/debt/?y1=2017&scope=schools.
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Table 7. Average Amount Borrowed Across Law Schools, Class of 2017






The law schools with persistently very weak employment outcomes also 
tend to have higher average student debt amounts for those graduates who 
borrowed. Of the twenty schools that had FT, LT, BPR employment rates 
less than 45% in 2013 and again in 2017,48 eighteen have reported average debt 
figures in at least one year since 2012. (Only eight of the schools reported 
average debt for 2017 graduates.) Of these eighteen, over half (ten) are in the 
top quartile, with seven in the top decile (in the year for which the most recent 
data is available). Only one, a public school, is in the bottom decile. One of 
the ten schools with a FT, LT, BPR employment rate below 35% for the classes 
of 2013 and 2017 had the highest average graduate debt of any reporting school 
in 2017, at $198,962. 49
D. The Value of a J.D. Degree
It appears clear that the value of a law degree has substantially exceeded 
the cost of obtaining it for the large majority of people who graduated from 
law school before 2009;50 however, it is not known whether any particular 
schools had been graduating large numbers of students for whom this was not 
the case. Furthermore, the available data cast considerable doubt on whether 
the law degree continues to yield the large earnings premium attributed to 
the law degree versus a terminal undergraduate degree for a large majority of 
law school graduates.51 However, any definitive conclusions are not possible 
48. See supra notes 31-34, and accompanying text (discussing twenty law schools with persistently 
very weak employment outcomes).





50. See generally Simkovic & McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, supra note 3.
51. See, e.g., Life After Law School, supra note 3, at 19 (finding lower levels of “financial well-being” 
and higher levels of financial difficulty by more recent law school graduates, that “[t]he 
percentage of . . . study participants who report that they had a good job awaiting them 
when they graduated from law school has decreased consistently over time, from a high of 70 
percent among 1960-1969 graduates to a low of 38 percent among 2010-2015 graduates,” and 
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without more data on earnings and loan repayment by law graduates on a 
school-by-school basis. 
At the same time, there is no basis to conclude that law school today is an 
investment that enables most students at every law school to repay their law 
student loans.52 Indeed, a number of schools have both exceptionally high 
average graduate debt and exceptionally low graduate legal employment rates 
ten months after graduation. Over one-third of the schools with persistently 
very weak employment outcomes from 2013 to 2017 are also in the top 10th 
percentile for average amount borrowed (in the recent year for which the most 
recent data is available). The law school with the highest average amount 
borrowed per graduate in the Class of 2017 reported only 29% of 2017 graduates 
in FT, LT, BPR jobs at ten months after graduation. It appears likely that such 
schools are receiving a substantial taxpayer subsidy.
E. The Relationship Between LSAT Scores, the Cost of Legal Education, 
and Bar Pass and Employment Outcomes
Overall, law school applicants with the lowest LSAT scores pay more for 
law school tuition but have markedly worse bar passage and employment 
outcomes. Jerry Organ has recently completed a study funded by the Access 
Group53 finding that applicants with LSAT scores in the lowest range (below 
that 32% of 2000-2015 graduates stated that law school was not worth the cost); Burk, supra 
note 3; Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010?, supra note 3; After the JD III: Third Results from 
a National Study of Legal Careers, The AmericAn BAr FoundATion And The nAlp FoundATion 
For lAw cAreer reSeArch And educATion 2014 45, http://www.americanbarfoundation.
org/uploads/cms/documents/ajd3report_final_for_distribution.pdf (last visited May 27, 
2018) (suggesting that the Great Recession had a significant negative impact on earnings 
that extended beyond the end of the Recession for most lawyers in small firms, while lawyers 
in larger law firms saw significant increases in income between 2007 and 2012); William D. 
Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession—
And It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, ABA JournAl (July 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/paradigm_shift.
52. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1 (finding that “[c]urrent prices not only lead to debt levels not 
sustainable at typical earnings levels, but likely generate earnings premiums for many 
students that do not support the investment”); Jim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The 
Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates’ Economic Viability, 38 
wm. miTchell. l. rev. 1185 (2013) (concluding that education debt should not exceed one 
and one-half times starting salary or require more than twelve percent of monthly income 
repayment); Jerome M. Organ, Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal Education, 41 wASh. 
u. J. l. & pol’y 33 (2013) (using Chen’s debt guidelines, estimating that only one-third of 
Class of 2011 graduates had “marginal financial viability,” with monthly payments on debt 
amortized over twenty-five years not exceeding twelve percent of gross income or debt of 
not more than 1.5 times starting salary); After the JD III, supra note 51, at 45 (reporting that 
lawyer salaries in the 25th percentile had decreased between 2007 and 2012); Jane Yakowitz, 
Marooned: An Empirical Investigation of Law School Graduates Who Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J. leg. ed. 4, 
30-35 (2010) (earnings of graduates who never pass a bar examination are well below those of 
lawyers (and also are lower than average college graduates) for the first five to ten years after 
law school, but in the latter half of their careers they achieve earnings comparable to lawyers 
in the bottom 25th percentile of earnings).
53. Organ, Net Tuition Trends, supra note 3. 
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145) paid the highest average net tuition, $32,912, in 2014. (While this finding 
may be surprising at first blush, it likely reflects that schools with the lowest 
LSAT profiles have pricing power because many of their students cannot gain 
admission at more selective schools and have few options.)54 At the same time, 
law schools with median LSAT scores from 145-149 had the lowest weighted-
average first-time bar pass rates—less than sixty percent in 2015—compared 
with law schools with higher LSAT score ranges. The average percentage of 
“bad news” employment outcomes (unemployed seeking, unemployed not 
seeking, and employment status unknown) for graduates of these schools was 
the highest among all categories of law schools, at over 25% for the graduating 
Class of 2012, as was imputed average income (starting salary), at less than 
$45,000.55 In sum, the study concludes that even though students with lower 
LSAT scores generally are paying more for their legal education, the short-term 
return on their investment is generally much less than the return of those with 
higher LSAT scores who are paying the same or less for their legal education.56 
Table 8. Organ/Access Group Study on J.D. Costs  













165+ $32,703 89% 3.8% $99,100
160-164 $23,994 81% 9.9% $65,200
155-159 $23,948 77.8% 11.8% $55,900
150-154 $26,066 67.9% 16.5% $50,700
145-149 $29,741 56.2% 25.9% $43,800
<145 $33,435 Not reported Not reported Not reported
F. The Differential Costs and Outcomes of Law School for Black and Hispanic Law Students
As law school enrollments have declined by nearly 30% since 2010, the 
number of minority matriculants has remained steady. Thus, the percentage of 
law students who are black and Hispanic has increased during the downturn 
in law school enrollments. However, more minority students are enrolling at 
schools with lower LSAT scores, while minority enrollments at schools with 
higher LSAT scores have declined since 2011.57 Aaron Taylor has expressed the 
concern that some schools have increased minority enrollment as a “survival 
strategy.” “Put simply,” he writes, “black and Hispanic students have increased 
54. See id. at 6.
55. Id. at 14, 16. Moreover, the trends with respect to cost and bar passage at these schools have 
been decidedly negative over the past several years. Average net tuition at schools with an 
LSAT median below 145 increased by nearly twelve percent from 2010 to 2014, while bar pass 
rates declined by more than four percentage points at schools with median LSAT scores 
from 145-149 from 2013 to 2015. Id. at 5, 13.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education, supra note 2, at 17-19. 
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their proportions among law schools considered least prestigious while 
essentially being shut out of schools considered most prestigious. White and 
Asian students, on the other hand, have reaped the benefits of the increasingly 
competitive admissions climate.”58
The available data indicate that women and minorities are 
disproportionately hurt by law school pricing practices. Organ’s study found 
that, because “students of color and women make up much larger percentages 
of students in law schools with lower median LSATs,” “[t]he average net 
tuition trends . . . suggest that [they] are being disproportionately impacted 
by the net tuition pricing differentials reflected in these data.”59 
The 2016 Law School Survey of Student Engagement supports this finding. 
Black and Latino respondents to the survey were significantly less likely (49% 
and 53%, respectively) to receive merit scholarships than white and Asian 
students (67% and 61%, respectively). Likewise, black and Latino respondents 
(53% and 57%, respectively) were more likely to expect to incur over $100,000 
in law school debt compared with white and Asian respondents (38% and 
40%, respectively).60 
As reported in Table 9 below, the After the JD III study found that at about 
twelve years after being admitted to the bar, minority lawyers tended to have 
higher debt levels than white lawyers.61 The comparative median income and 
debt amounts from After the JD III are summarized in the following table.62
58. Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. louiS u. l.J. 321, 355 (2014).
59. Organ, Net Tuition Trends, supra note 3, at 18.
60. Paul Caron, Law School Survey of Student Engagement, Law School Scholarship Policies: Engines of Inequity, 
TAxproF Blog (Feb. 9, 2017), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/02/lssselaw-
school-merit-scholarship-policies-engines-of-inequity.html#more; see also Aaron N. Taylor, 
Robin Hood, In Reverse: How Law School Scholarships Compound Inequality, 47 J.l. & educ. 41 (2018) 
(analyzing data from the 2016 Law School Survey of Student Engagement; concluding that 
“law school scholarships flow most lucratively to students who tend to come from privileged 
backgrounds, contributing, most notably, to increased student loan debt among students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. The result is a cascade of negative outcomes, including a 
‘reverse Robin Hood’ cost-shifting strategy through which disadvantaged students subsidize 
the tuition of their peers from privileged backgrounds.”).
61. After the JD III, supra note 51, at 76-77, 80-81 (study based on a survey of a sample of 2862 
lawyers admitted to the bar in 2000); accord Yakowitz, supra note 52, at 14, 15.
62. After the JD III, supra note 51, at 76-77, 80-81. 
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% with debt > 
$100,000
% paid off loans 
in full
White $124,000 $50,000 5.2 48.4%
Asian $120,600 $37,000 2.0 60.1%
Black $112,000 $57,000 7.3 23.3%
Hispanic $130,000 $75,000 15.5 30.4%
III. The Case for an Employment Outcome Standard
As the ED-recognized accrediting agency for all J.D. programs in the United 
States,63 the ABA Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions 
to the Bar plays a gatekeeping function; accreditation is a prerequisite to 
participation in Title IV student aid programs, most importantly in the federal 
student loan programs.64 The ED criteria for recognition of an accrediting 
agency primarily focus, of course, on assuring the quality of the programs 
and institutions that participate in the federal student aid programs. One 
of the ED’s key criteria for recognition, taken verbatim from the HEOA,65 
requires accreditors to impose student outcome standards on the programs or 
institutions that they accredit. It states: 
The agency must demonstrate that it has standards for accreditation . . . 
that are sufficiently rigorous to ensure that the agency is a reliable authority 
regarding the quality of the education or training provided by the . . . programs 
it accredits. The agency meets this requirement if—
(1) The accreditation agency’s standards effectively address the quality of 
the institution or program in the following areas: 
(i) Success with respect to student achievement in relation to the 
institution’s mission, . . . including, as appropriate, consideration of 
course completion, State licensing examination, and job placement 
rates.66
63. See Accreditation in the United States, u.S. depArTmenT oF educATion, http://www2.ed.gov/
admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg5.html#NationallyRecognized (last visited May 27, 
2018).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a). It is not widely appreciated that, of the 205 J.D. programs that have ABA 
accreditation, only about fifteen are independent law schools for which ABA accreditation 
provides access to the Title IV student aid programs. About 190 ABA-approved law schools 
are part of institutions that are accredited by one of the ED-recognized regional accreditors, 
and therefore participate in the Title IV student aid programs by virtue of their parent 
institution’s accreditation. Further, in recent years, several of the approximately fifteen 
independent law schools have obtained regional accreditation so that students in their non-
J.D. programs will be eligible for federal student aid programs under Title IV.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 495(2)(A) (2016).
66. Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(1) (2010). The remaining sections of the regulation require 
standards concerning curriculum, faculty, finances, and the like. See id. § 602.16(a).
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As noted, the expressed purpose of the HEOA/ED mandate is to ensure 
that student outcomes align with the objectives of the accredited program or 
institution—that is, that students realize the promise of the degree. In addition, 
the mandate serves to protect taxpayer dollars by helping to ensure that 
graduates can repay the loans that they take.67 
The current ABA standards are not “sufficiently rigorous” and do not 
“effectively address the quality” of some law school programs. Specifically, 
some schools with persistently very weak graduate employment outcomes 
are able to pursue admission and other policies that further diminish their 
graduates’ employment prospects. An employment outcome standard will 
better serve the purposes underlying the HEOA/ED mandate.
A. Law Graduate Legal Employment Rates as a Measure of Whether 
Student Outcomes Align with J.D. Program Objectives
If one accepts the premise that the large majority of law students attend 
law school to practice law,68 the case for an employment rate standard that 
requires law schools to demonstrate that outcomes align with objectives is 
straightforward. The ABA accreditation standards themselves state that the 
objectives of a law school academic program are to “prepare . . . students, 
upon graduation, for admission to the bar and for effective . . . participation 
as members of the legal profession.”69 A law school that persistently places 
very low percentages of its graduates in law jobs patently is not fulfilling the 
promise of the J.D. degree program. The high cost of legal education heightens 
the need for an employment outcome standard.70 The negative repercussions 
of a low graduate legal employment rate are magnified where graduates have 
borrowed substantial sums to obtain the law degree, regardless of whether 
they are able to repay their student loans according to the terms. 
Persistently weak employment outcomes indicate a shortcoming in the 
quality of a school’s program, perhaps inadequate admission standards in 
particular. Passing a bar exam is only part of what is required to participate in 
the legal profession, and even where a school has a very high bar passage rate, 
it may be failing to produce graduates sufficiently qualified or prepared for the 
67. See supra notes 12 and 15, and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
69. ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 15 (Standard 301(a)). Standard 301 is titled “Objectives of 
Program of Legal Education.” Standard 301(b) provides further that “[a] law school shall 
establish and publish learning outcomes designed to achieve these objectives.” Id. Perhaps 
it could be argued that the objective of a J.D. program is limited to preparing students for 
the practice of law, without regard to whether graduates are able to use the degree in a law 
job. So long as law school prepares students to pass a bar examination and practice law, the 
objective of the program is met, apart from whether the graduate obtains a law job. This 
argument ignores, however, the reality that students attend law school to both prepare for 
the practice of law and to practice law. Preparation for practice is a hollow objective apart 
from becoming part of the profession. 
70. See supra notes 38-46 (discussing law graduate debt levels).
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practice of law. Thus, the ABA standards require law schools both to prepare 
students to pass a bar examination and for the practice of law.71 Bar passage is 
necessary, but not sufficient. In a market where there are persistently more law 
school graduates than available law jobs, the qualifications for employment may 
be higher, and the level of preparation required thus will be greater. Schools 
with persistently low legal employment rates have not met the demands of 
the entry-level legal employment market. The reasons may be varied and 
cumulative, including the ability of students (admission requirements), the 
quality of the faculty, the rigor and relevance of the academic program, and 
the level of career services provided by the school. 
While the ED recognition criteria do not mandate any particular student 
outcome standards, the outcome standards adopted by the accreditor must 
be effective.72 Currently, the ABA has the equivalent of a minimum course 
completion rate standard. ABA Standard 501(b) prohibits schools from 
admitting applicants who do not appear capable of completing law school 
and passing a bar examination,73 and the ABA closely monitors law schools’ 
admission requirements and academic attrition rates.74 The ABA also has a 
licensing exam passage rate standard—ABA Standard 316, the bar examination 
passage standard.75 While the ABA requires schools to collect and report 
detailed graduate employment outcome information,76 the accreditation 
standards presently do not address employment outcomes. 
An ABA employment outcome standard would redress a gap in the ABA’s 
current outcome standards. The current standards on attrition and bar passage 
have not effectively constrained some schools with persistently very weak 
graduate employment outcomes to improve those outcomes. To the contrary, 
as discussed above, some schools with dismal graduate employment outcomes 
have responded to the decline in law school applications by enrolling more 
students with markedly lower LSAT scores, almost inevitably leading to 
lower bar passage rates and further diminished employment prospects for 
their graduates.77 Moreover, some of the same schools with weak employment 
outcomes and significant declines in entering class credentials also report high 
average student debt amounts (or no longer report the amount).78 Minority 
71. ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 15 (Standard 301(a)).
72. 34 CFR § 602.16 (2010)(“accrediting agency standards [must] effectively address the quality 
of the institution or program . . . .”). 
73. ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 31 (Standard 501(b)).
74. ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 52-53 (Rule 6(b)(4)).
75. ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 24 (Standard 316). The Council is currently considering 
revising the standard to both simplify it and make it more rigorous. See infra notes 110-114 and 
accompanying text regarding revisions to the standard and the status of its final approval.
76. Standard 509(b)(7), ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 35.
77. See supra notes 31-37, and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 48-49, and accompanying text.
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students in particular are more likely to pay higher tuition, incur more debt, 
pass the bar at lower rates, and realize worse employment outcomes.79 The 
transparency of schools’ employment outcomes80 and quasi transparency of 
the average indebtedness of schools’ graduates81 have not led applicants to 
avoid schools with extremely weak employment outcomes, at least where those 
applicants present credentials that will not gain them admission to schools 
with better employment outcomes. 
B. An Employment Outcome Standard as a Check on Unintended 
Taxpayer Subsidies for Law Schools
A subsidiary purpose of the ED requirement of student outcome standards 
is to conserve federal tax dollars.82 As explained by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in an opinion upholding the ED’s gainful 
employment rule,83 
[t]he conditions attached to Title IV funds “are intended to ensure that 
participating schools actually prepare their students for employment, such 
that those students can repay their loans.” . . . The financial aid at issue is, 
after all, a “loan,” not a scholarship, grant, or award. It would be strange for 
Congress to loan out money to train students for jobs that were insufficiently 
remunerative to permit the students to repay their loans. And it would be a 
perverse system that, by design, wasted taxpayer money in order to impose 
crippling, credit-destroying debt on lower-income students and graduates.84
79. See supra notes 57-62, and accompanying text.
80. ABA Standard 509(b)(7) requires that “[a] law school shall publicly disclose on its website, 
in the form and manner and for the time frame designated by the Council, . . . employment 
outcomes.” ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 35. In addition, all schools’ Employment Summary 
Reports are available on the ABA website, http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.
org/.
81. Data on average indebtedness are not collected by the ABA, nor do most schools publish 
them on their websites, but they are collected and reported by U.S. News. The U.S. News 
information can also be found on the Law School Transparency website, at http://www.
lawschooltransparency.com/reform/projects/Law-School-Financing/?show=2015. 
82. See, e.g., Duncan, 640 Fed. App’x at 8 (upholding the ED’s gainful employment rule, which 
conditions access to Title IV student aid programs by proprietary and post-secondary 
vocational schools on graduates of the institution achieving a specified minimum ratio of 
student loan debt to income).
83. The gainful employment rule requires that graduates of proprietary and post-secondary 
vocational schools meet specified debt-to-earnings ratios. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.401 et seq. 
84. Duncan, 640 Fed. App’x at 8 (quoting Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges and Universities v. Duncan, 
681 F.3d 427, 433-34 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). The “gainful employment rule,” a federal regulation 
promulgated by the Department of Education pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1002(b), (c) (2010), 
conditions participation in Title IV student aid programs by proprietary and postsecondary 
vocational institutions on meeting minimum student debt-to-income metrics. See 79 Fed. 
Reg. 64,889 (Oct. 31, 2014).
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Taxpayers subsidize higher education, including legal education, in part 
by assuming the risk that students who borrow money under one of the Title 
IV federal student loan programs will not repay their loans.85 (The purpose 
underlying the subsidy is to promote access to higher education for students 
who cannot otherwise afford it.86) The ED remits the monies borrowed by 
students for tuition directly to the eligible education institution,87 which 
assumes no risk that individual students will not complete the program, pass a 
licensing exam, obtain suitable employment, and repay the debt. The greater 
the risk that a student will not obtain suitable employment, and thus have the 
means to repay her student loan debt, the larger the federal subsidy for the 
school at which the student is enrolled. Stated differently, at institutions with 
strong graduate employment outcomes, the taxpayer subsidy is minimal, while 
at institutions with weak graduate employment outcomes, the subsidy may be 
quite large. Moreover, where a law school reports a low legal employment rate, 
the starting salaries of the graduates who obtain law jobs likely fall, for the 
most part, on the lower end of the salary range.88
A large majority, more than seventy-five percent, of law students borrow to 
finance their legal educations,89 and most law schools are tuition-dependent.90 
The federal government loaned more than $3 billion to the students who 
graduated from ABA-accredited law schools in 2017.91 The schools that are 
the most tuition-dependent also tend to be the schools with the weakest 
employment outcomes.92 Moreover, most of the same schools with persistently 
85. This risk is at least partially accounted for by the interest rates charged for the loans, but that 
is not the issue. The rates are higher for all borrowers to the extent that institutions receive 
unwarranted subsidies because their graduates’ employment outcomes do not support 
repayment of their loans. The availability of student loan refinancing also drives up the 
cost of borrowing under the federal direct student loan program. Private lenders refinance 
low-risk borrowers’ loans at below the government interest rate, thereby decreasing the 
subsidy that lower-risk borrowers provide to higher-risk borrowers under the federal loan 
program, which issues loans without underwriting. See Kyle P. McEntee, How Student Loan 
Refinancing Could Undo Federal Loan Policy, ABove The lAw (Jan. 26, 2016), http://abovethelaw.
com/2016/01/how-student-loan-refinancing-could-undo-federal-loan-policy/?rf=1. 
86. See generally Kerry A. Ryan, Access Assured: Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for 
Higher Education, 38 SeTon hAll l. rev. 1, 5-10 (2008).
87. See 20 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2017).
88. TAmAnAhA, supra note 3, at 157.
89. “[T]he percentage of law graduates who borrow . . . has been over 85% at least since 2003-
04.” Baum, supra note 3, at 4. This compares with fifty-six percent of students in all programs. 
Investing in Higher Education: Benefits, Challenges, and the State of Student Debt, execuTive oFFice oF 
The preSidenT oF The uniTed STATeS 22 (July 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160718_cea_student_debt.pdf.
90. Law School Costs: Debt, supra note 35.
91. Id. (calculating that the federal government loaned approximately $3.07 billion).
92. Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education, supra note 2, at 22 (“Private GI [lowest-tier] schools are 
by far the most tuition-dependent (the same schools noted above for their low employment 
rates). In AY 2012-13 the average was ninety-five percent of revenue.”); see also 2015 State of Legal 
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very weak employment outcomes also report high average student debt 
amounts.93
The extent of the federal taxpayer subsidy to law schools is difficult to 
estimate. The default rate on law student loans is quite low,94 but default 
rate does not begin to capture the true rate of loan repayment because of the 
widely available income-driven repayment (IDR) plans.95 IDR is “designed 
for those for whom standard repayment would be a great hardship” resulting 
from a combination of high student loan debt and insufficient income to 
service the debt.96 These IDR plans offer loan forgiveness at the end of a 
longer repayment period, with payments calculated as a percentage of the 
borrower’s discretionary income. Thus, where a borrower’s income is not 
sufficient to pay modest living expenses and service the loan debt, payments 
are reduced while unpaid interest is added to the principal obligation. In this 
way, the amount borrowed may continue to increase during “repayment.” IDR 
payment amounts can be little or nothing depending on the amount of the 
borrower’s discretionary income. A law school receives a subsidy to the extent 
that a graduate does not repay student loan debt through an IDR plan.
It appears likely that the extent of the subsidy is quite large for some 
schools. A recent report from the General Accounting Office estimates that 
the IDR plans will cost upward of $74 billion, more than twice the amount 
originally estimated for loans made in 2009-2016. The huge increase in the cost 
of the programs is due largely to the increasing numbers of borrowers opting 
into the IDR plans.97 At some law schools, the bulk of graduates likely qualify 
Education, Visual Data Navigator, lAw School TrAnSpArency, http://lawschooltransparency.
com/reform/projects/investigations/2015/data/visualize/?g=tfi&show=jobs (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2017) (reporting on federal investment in law schools categorized by employment 
outcomes).
93. See infra notes 48-49, and accompanying text.
94. See Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, u.S. depArTmenT oF educATion: FederAl STudenT 
Aid (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html 
(providing official cohort default rates for institutions, including independent law schools, 
participating in title IV student aid programs).
95. There are currently five different IDR plans, each one available to a different set of borrowers. 
The plans provide for payment of a percentage, ranging from ten percent to twenty percent, 
of a borrower’s discretionary income, and for forgiveness of the unpaid balance of the loan 
after twenty to twenty-five years. The amount of debt forgiven is taxable as income. See Report 
to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate, Federal Student Loans, Education Needs to Improve 
Its Income-Driven Repayment Plan Budget Estimates, uniTed STATeS governmenT AccounTABiliTy 
oFFice 5 (Nov. 2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681064.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
In addition, there is the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, available to graduates 
in certain government and public interest positions, which provides for payments over ten 
years, after which the unpaid balance is forgiven (and the amount forgiven is not taxable as 
income). 
96. Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers and Other 
Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 hoFSTrA l. rev. 27, 41 (2007).
97. See GAO Report, supra note 95, at 12-13.
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for IDR in light of the high average law school debt and the relatively low 
entry-level salaries reported by graduates.98 
C. Arguments Against an Employment Outcome Standard
Several arguments against an employment outcome standard can be 
anticipated. One is that such a standard is paternalistic, that qualified applicants 
should be free to choose to attend the law school of their choice without regard 
to any particular school’s graduate employment outcomes, as long as full and 
accurate bar passage and employment outcome information is available. It 
may also be argued that the ABA’s revised admission and proposed revised bar 
passage standards will more effectively address the law graduate employment 
problem than an employment outcome standard. Further, it will be contended 
that an employment outcome standard will lead to the closure of law schools 
that provide access to the legal profession for underrepresented minorities. 
Finally, arguably the more effective way to limit unintended subsidies to law 
schools (and any other higher education institution that participates in the 
federal Title IV student aid programs) would be to cap the amount that can 
be borrowed under the federal student aid programs, and thereby require 
schools to directly assume some of the risk of student loan nonrepayment. 
These arguments are considered in turn. 
1. An Employment Outcome Standard is Paternalistic
Since the 1960s, the ABA has followed a course that has significantly 
increased the number of accredited law schools. Over the past fifty years, the 
number of ABA-accredited law schools has increased by over one-half, from 
135 in 1963-1964 to 205 schools today, and first-year enrollments grew by over 
150 percent from 20,776 in 1963-1964 to 52,488 in 2010-2011.99 For most of this 
period, the expansion of legal education coincided with an increase in the 
number of law jobs for law school graduates.100 To date, of course, accreditation 
has not depended upon meeting any minimum legal employment outcome 
requirement. The ABA adopted its bar passage standard in 2009.
It may be argued that the market of law school applicants, not an 
accrediting agency, is the most efficient regulator of law school enrollments. 
Indeed, the law school applicant market has responded to the decline in the 
legal employment market, as evidenced by the sharp decrease in applications 
over the past seven years.101 The argument continues, if a law school provides 
a legal education of sufficient quality to prepare students for admission to the 
98. See TAmAnAhA, supra note 3, at 123.
99. Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2012, ABA SecTion oF legAl educATion And AdmiSSionS To 
The BAr, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_
and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf 
(last visited May 27, 2018).
100. Burk, supra note 3, at 564-65.
101. See infra note 108.
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bar and the practice of law, it should be no concern to the accreditor whether 
graduates of the school can actually use the degree. As long as applicants have 
access to complete and accurate data on a law school’s graduate employment 
outcomes, they can make informed decisions on whether law school is a good 
investment. It would be paternalistic to make that decision for them no matter 
how remote the odds of obtaining legal employment with a degree from a 
given school.102 
To assert that the applicant market rather than the accreditor is the more 
efficient regulator of law school enrollments fails to recognize that the higher 
education applicant market is anything but normally functioning. The 
market is not efficient in the case of higher education because the transactions 
involved create large external costs. As noted above, the large majority of law 
school students borrow to attend.103 Schools receive payment of their students’ 
borrowed tuition dollars upfront and without assuming any of the risk that any 
individual student will be unable to repay her debt. The federal government 
makes and students obtain Title IV loans to cover the full cost of tuition at an 
accredited school without regard to the risk of nonrepayment. The availability 
of loans without underwriting feeds an optimism bias on the part of student 
borrowers104 and artificially fuels enrollments that would not occur in a private 
student loan market.105 (In addition, the federal student aid programs likely 
have fueled the increases in the cost of education, especially legal education.106) 
The dysfunction of the legal education marketplace seemingly is confirmed 
by the fact that students continue to enroll in and pay very high tuitions at 
schools with persistently very weak legal employment rates notwithstanding 
substantial transparency in law graduate employment outcomes. (And the 
same can be said for enrollment at schools with very low bar pass rates.) 
102. Cf. Noah Feldman, Don’t Baby Law School Applicants, BloomgBerg (Oct. 27, 2015), https://
www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-27/don-t-baby-law-school-applicants (“Those 
who think law schools shouldn’t admit students with low test scores are reflecting, whether 
they know it or not, a culture of paternalism that verges on infantilization.”); see also Austen 
Parrish, Dean’s Desk: A troubling focus by the ABA on the bar exam, The indiAnA lAwyer (Nov. 16, 
2016), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/deans-desk-a-troubling-focus-by-the-aba-on-the-
bar-exam/PARAMS/article/42025 (addressing the ABA’s proposed revised bar admission 
standard, Parrish argues that if the standard takes effect, “it’s because the ABA believes 
students with lower LSAT test scores should be denied opportunities for their own good 
. . . . There’s little evidence that students choosing to attend law school don’t understand 
the risks and the potential rewards . . . . [R]arely have we been so openly paternalistic as to 
suggest the ABA should make this decision for them.”).
103. See supra note 89, and accompanying text.
104. See TAmAnAhA, supra note 3, at 143-44 (citing TAli ShAroT, The opTimiSm BiAS: A Tour oF 
The irrATionAlly poSiTive BrAin (2011)).
105. See discussion infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text, regarding proposals to cap amounts 
that can be borrowed under the federal student loan programs to attend law school, forcing 
students into the private lending market.
106. See Goldie Blumenstyk, The ‘Bennett Hypothesis,’ on Why College Prices Rise, Is Alive and Well, The 
chronicle oF higher educATion (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.chronicle.com/article/
The-Bennett-Hypothesis-on/130880.
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Further, the paternalism argument fails to acknowledge the interest of 
taxpayers and other student loan borrowers in graduate employment outcomes, 
as they foot the costs of the unpaid student loans. As discussed above, this is 
one of the policies underlying the HEOA/ED provision mandating student 
outcome measures, which is directed at ensuring the quality of the program 
and permits an (effective) employment rate standard as a measure of quality.107 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the paternalism argument would do away with 
accreditation standards entirely. 
Related to the paternalism argument, some may contend that an employment 
outcome standard is essentially an anticompetitive trade association attempt 
to restrain competition among lawyers by limiting the number of entrants into 
the profession. This contention misconstrues the purpose of the standard, 
however. Again, the objective is to fill a gap in the current standards that 
allows or encourages law schools to pursue admission policies that are directly 
at odds with improving profoundly weak graduate employment outcomes. As 
discussed above, a school’s persistently weak legal employment rates indicate 
that the market lacks confidence in the quality of the law school’s program, 
whether it be the quality of the faculty, students, academic program, career 
services, or some combination of these or other factors.
2. Revised ABA Admission and Bar Passage Standards Will Effectively 
Address the Law Graduate Employment Problem
It may also be argued that the law graduate employment problem facing 
legal education, if there is one, is that the number of law school matriculants 
has not declined commensurate with the number of applicants.108 As a 
result, the conventional qualifications of the matriculant pool have declined 
substantially.109 The solution to this problem is stricter admission and 
bar passage standards, not regulating law schools based on employment 
outcomes. In fact, the ABA has done exactly this by moving to tighten the 
admission and bar passage standards. Perhaps the revised standards would 
significantly reduce enrollments and the number of law school graduates 
107. See 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(1); 20 U.S.C. § 495(2)(A) (2017).
108. While enrollments have declined by nearly thirty percent since 2010 (from 52,488 in 2010 
to 37,400 in 2017), see https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2017_509_enrollment_
summary_report.authcheckdam.pdf (2017 figure) and https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (2009-2010 data), applications 
have declined by nearly thirty-six percent (from 87,900 in 2010 to 56,400 in 2017), see 
https://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/aba-eoy (2017 data) and http://www.lsac.org/
lsacresources/data/lsac-volume-summary/archive (2010 data).
109. See, e.g., Jerry Organ, Updated Analysis of Attrition through the 2014-2015 Academic Year, The legAl 
whiTeBoArd (Feb. 27, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2016/02/
updated-analysis-of-attrition-through-the-2014-15-academic-year.html (reporting on the 
declines in LSAT scores as law school applications have fallen). 
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would more closely align with available law jobs, making an employment 
outcome standard superfluous. 
The pending changes to Standard 316 would make it slightly stricter. The 
revised standard would eliminate the first-time bar pass rate alternative under 
the current standard, and make ultimate bar pass rate the sole criterion. The 
minimum ultimate bar pass rate would remain at 75%, but the measurement 
period would be reduced from five to two years.110 Final approval of the 
proposed revised bar passage standard was in doubt as of press time for 
this article.111 Even if it is implemented and causes some schools to reduce 
enrollments, it will not remedy the gap in the current standards that allows 
or encourages schools to admit students without regard to employment 
outcomes. As under the current standards, as long as a school is in compliance 
with the bar passage standard, it has wide latitude to admit applicants without 
regard to their employment prospects. 
Indeed, an effective employment outcome standard may obviate the need 
for a bar passage standard, and the ABA should consider eliminating the bar 
passage standard with the adoption of an employment outcome standard. Bar 
passage is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite to most legal employment. 
While a school can meet a bar passage standard without regard to placing 
graduates in law jobs, graduates cannot obtain most law jobs without passing 
a bar exam. Further, schools have no control over bar exams, but they and 
their alumni can do much to promote employment of their graduates.
Replacing the bar passage standard with an employment outcome standard 
may reduce the regulatory burden on law schools. Under the current bar 
passage standard, schools must report bar examination outcomes for only 
seventy percent of graduates.112 Under the revised standard, schools would be 
110. See Summary of Council Actions Related to Standards at its October 2016 Meeting, AmericAnBAr.
o r g ,ht tp://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrat ive/ legal_
education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/
October2016CouncilMaterials/2016_october_council_summary_of_actions.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited May 27, 2018). The proposed revised Standard 316 provides: 
“At least 75% of a law school’s graduates in a calendar year who sat for a bar examination 
must have passed a bar examination within two years of their date of graduation.” See id.
111. The governing Council of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar approved a revised Standard 316 in October 2016. See id. Under the ABA’s bylaws, 
changes to the accreditation standards are effective upon approval by the Council and 
concurrence by the ABA House of Delegates (HOD). When the HOD does not concur, 
the proposed changes are returned to the Council for reconsideration. However, after a 
second determination by the HOD not to concur in a proposed change, the Council may 
approve the standard for a third time, and it will take effect without HOD concurrence. The 
HOD declined to concur in the changes to Standard 316 at its midyear meeting in February 
2017. See Stephanie Francis Ward, ABA House rejects proposal to tighten bar-pass standards for law 
schools, ABA JournAl (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_house_
rejects_proposal_to_tighten_bar_pass_standards_for_law_schools. As of press time, the 
Council had not reconsidered or reapproved the proposed revised standard.
112. Standard 316(a)(1) and (2) (hanging paragraphs), ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 24.
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expected to report on bar passage for all graduates.113 This increased burden is 
significant for many schools because the bar examiners in some jurisdictions 
will not release bar pass information to law schools. By contrast, under the 
existing employment data reporting system, schools are able to report on the 
employment outcomes of ninety-eight percent of graduates at ten months 
after graduation.114
The change to the admission standard, which became effective in 
February 2017, is not a change to the standard itself, but the addition of a 
new interpretation of the standard. The new interpretation provides: “A law 
school having a non-transfer attrition rate above 20 percent bears the burden 
of proving that it is in compliance with the Standard.”115 The import of the 
new interpretation is that it sets twenty percent in nontransfer attrition as 
the threshold at which a school is presumptively out of compliance with the 
standard’s requirement that a school “only admit applicants who appear 
capable of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education and being 
admitted to the bar.”116 
Again, this change appears unlikely to effectively constrain schools from 
pursuing admission policies that minimize reduction in class size without 
regard to employment outcomes. There are fourteen schools that reported 
nontransfer attrition rates greater than twenty percent for the 2016 entering 
class.117 About one-third —seven — of the twenty schools that have reported 
persistently very weak employment outcomes118 reported nontransfer attrition 
rates greater than twenty percent in 2017 (for the entering Class of 2016). Thus, 
while the new interpretation may catch some of the schools with persistently 
very weak employment outcomes, it will miss most of them. Further, some 
113. See supra note 110 (quoting the proposed revised standard).
114. Over ninety-eight percent of Class of 2017 graduates reported their employment status to 
their schools. See Employment Outcomes As Of April 2018 (Class of 2017 Graduates), ABA SecTion oF 
legAl educATion And AdmiSSionS To The BAr (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
statistics/2017_law_graduate_employment_data.authcheckdam.pdf.
115. See Barry A. Currier, Memorandum to Interested Persons and Entities: Adoption and Implementation 
of Revised ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, AmericAn BAr 





116. Standard 501(b), ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 31.
117. Spreadsheet of ABA accredited law school’s Standard 509 Information Reports found at 
Compilation—All Schools Data, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org (selecting 2017 and 
J.D. Attrition from the dropdown menus, Column DV).
118. See supra note 31-32, and accompanying text.
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schools might adjust their academic policies to stay within the twenty percent 
line.119
3. An Employment Outcome Standard Will Reduce Access to the Profession
Another argument that can be anticipated is that a graduate employment 
outcome standard will reduce access to the profession, and at the margin 
disproportionately harm lower-income and minority students. This is a 
leading argument against the proposed revised bar passage standard. As 
stated by Austen Parrish, “[l]egal education remains one of the few avenues 
for upward mobility (not a guarantee, but still a path). Broad access to a legal 
education serves [the profession] and society well. The rule of law is one of 
the foundations of our society, our political system, and our economic system, 
and we benefit when our society understands the importance of law and legal 
institutions.”120 
The profession gains no diversity when minority law graduates do not obtain 
law jobs. Moreover, the available data indicate that an employment outcome 
standard is especially needed to help ensure that minority students realize the 
promise of the J.D. degree. As discussed above, minority law students on the 
whole pay more for law school than nonminority students. At the same time, 
bar passage rates, employment rates, income levels, and debt levels tend to be 
worse for minority law school graduates.121 An employment standard would be 
another encouragement for alumni to hire minority graduates. Employment 
(in contrast to bar passage) is something that alumni can directly influence. On 
the other hand, however, some employers discriminate in the hiring of lawyers 
and therefore an employment outcome standard could disproportionately 
119. See Jerry Organ, Comments on Proposed Revisions to Standard 501, The legAl whiTeBoArd (Mar. 
8, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2016/03/-comments-on-
proposed-revisions-to-standard-501-.html.
120. See Austen L. Parrish, Parrish: More Thoughts on The ABA’s Proposed 75% Bar Passage Standard, 
TAxproF Blog (Dec. 21, 2016), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2016/12/
parrishmore-thoughts-on-the-abas-proposed-75-bar-passage-standard.html. Dean Parrish’s 
argument continues: “[T]he legal profession does best when it’s inclusive and reflects the 
diversity of the communities it serves. The new rule will hurt diversity in the profession. 
That’s undoubtedly true if diverse states like California have pass rates significantly below the 
national average and schools and students in those states are placed under greater scrutiny 
regardless of educational program quality.” See also Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Adding Clarity to 
Law School Transparency, The FAculTy lounge (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.thefacultylounge.
org/2015/12/adding-clarity-to-law-school-transparency.html (“[w]hen admission standards 
become easier, those at the margins of society—specifically the poor and black & brown 
racial and ethnic minorities—have the potential benefit. But just at the moment when it 
becomes easier for those at the margins to gain admission into the legal profession, the 
media and organizations like LST [Law School Transparency] engage in a crusade to vilify 
law schools and pressure them into accepting fewer students. This is done in the name of 
‘transparency’ and a paternalist drive to help the ‘unqualified’ applicant who is at high risk 
of failing the bar. Instead, LST’s strategy is at high risk of keeping black and brown people, 
and the poor from having the opportunity to ever sit for a bar”).
121. See supra notes 57-62, and accompanying text.
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adversely impact schools with larger enrollments of minority and women 
students or have an ex ante negative effect on admissions of minority and 
women students. Finally, there is substantial capacity in the system to increase 
enrollment even if some schools close; there is no reason to fear that closing 
schools in a down cycle might result in too few seats going forward. At least 
for the foreseeable future, more students could be accommodated in fewer 
schools.
4. Reforming the Federal Student Loan Program Will Most Effectively 
Address the Law Graduate Employment Problem
Another approach to the problem of persistently weak employment 
outcomes at some law schools (and the less than stellar employment outcomes 
at many other schools) is for the federal government to require schools to 
bear some of the risk that their graduates do not repay their student loans. 
Several commentators have urged that the federal government set a limit on 
the amount of money that can be borrowed to attend law school.122 Such a 
limit would force students to look to the private lending market (or to the 
law schools that they attend) to finance tuition and living expenses in excess 
of the cap. In turn, the private lending market would look to the schools to 
assure payment of at least a portion of their graduates’ loans in the event of 
default. Because private as well as federal student loans are nondischargeable 
in bankruptcy (except where repayment constitutes an “undue hardship” on 
the graduate),123 graduates likely would never escape liability for the loans. 
However, nondischargeability is not the same as repayment, and the private 
lenders would certainly underwrite their loans as they do now. 
This approach is market-based and therefore arguably a better response to 
the problem of persistently weak employment outcomes at some law schools. 
But it would be a radical change in the current federal student aid system that 
could decimate a large segment of legal education, and significantly reduce 
access to the profession. Better to address the problem in a more controlled 
way through accreditation before much more draconian measures are imposed 
from outside. Legal education has an obligation to fix its graduate employment 
problems before more draconian remedies are imposed by Congress or the 
Department of Education.
IV. The Use of Employment Outcome Standards 
by Other Ed-Recognized Accreditors
Currently, about a quarter of all ED-recognized programmatic accreditors124 
such as the ABA, which generally accredit a particular type of program 
122. See TAmAnAhA, supra note 3, at 178-81.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2016).
124. ED classifies accrediting agencies as regional, national, or programmatic. There are eight 
regional accreditors (such as the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and the 
Northwest Association of Colleges and Schools). Regional accreditation covers two- 
and four-year public and private nonprofit degree-granting institutions. See The Different 
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or school (and not institutions per se), currently have employment rate 
standards in place.125 Eleven of approximately forty programmatic accreditors 
use placement rate standards, ranging from seventy percent to ninety-eight 
percent, as a measure of student achievement. Most of these accreditors 
cover professional or quasi-professional programs that prepare students for 
employment in a particular health-related profession.126 Seven of the eleven 
also use licensing exam passage rates, while four use employment outcome 
standards but have no licensing exam passage standard. Nine programmatic 
accreditors, including the ABA, use license exam passage rates but currently 
have no employment outcome standard.127 
The ABA might be distinguished from the other professional program 
accreditors in that their degree programs qualify the graduates for employment 
only in the specific field of the program. By contrast, the law degree is more 
versatile; it can be and is held by professionals across a wide range of careers, 
from law to business, government, politics, education, and so forth. Therefore, 
it is arguably not appropriate to assess eligibility for Title IV funds based 
on graduate employment rates in a single profession, just as institutional 
accreditors do not have employment rate standards because their institutions 
offer a wide array of degree programs. However, as noted above, the typical 
Types of Accreditation, onlinecollegedegreeS.neT, http://www.onlinecollegedegrees.net/
accreditation-types.html (last visited May 27, 2018). A placement rate standard makes sense 
only where an educational program prepares graduates for employment in a particular 
career. Thus, none of the ED-recognized regional accreditors, which accredit institutions 
that offer a wide range of degree programs, have placement rate standards. 
125. In addition, six of eight national accreditors that accredit “specialized and nontraditional 
institutions like vocational colleges, technical colleges, religious colleges, and online 
universities,” also have employment rate standards. See Accreditation: Universities and Higher 
Education, u.S. depArTmenT oF educATion, http://www.ed.gov/accreditation?src=rn (last 
visited May 27, 2018). Three of these accreditors require seventy percent employment 
rates, two require sixty percent, and one requires employment rates of not less than one 
standard deviation from comparable schools. At least one of the national accreditors, the 
Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools, accredits institutions that offer 
programs in professional fields, including such programs as master’s in accounting, master’s 
in business administration, master’s in computer information, B.A. in nursing, and B.A. in 
pharmaceutical sciences. Regarding for-profit and postsecondary vocational schools, the 
ED’s gainful employment rule presumably will supplant any applicable employment rate 
standard.
126. The eleven programmatic accreditors with employment rate standards are the: Liaison 
Committee on Medical Education, American Osteopathic Association, Accreditation 
Council for Pharmacy Education, Commission on Collegiate Nursing Education, Council 
on Education for Public Health, Joint Review Committee on Education in Radiologic 
Technology, Accreditation Council for Education in Nutrition Dietetics, American Speech 
Language Hearing Association, Commission on Accreditation in Physical Therapy 
Education, Commission on Massage Therapy Accreditation, and Montessori Accreditation 
Council for Teacher Education. See id.
127. See id.
1069
law student goes to law school to practice law,128 although many will leave 
law practice for other careers after initial employment as a lawyer. The fact 
that some law degree holders pursue careers outside of law practice may be a 
reason to lower the minimum legal employment rate required of law schools, 
but it is not a reason for equating the ABA with regional as opposed to other 
programmatic accreditors.
V. Some Substatantive Considerations for a Draft Standard
This part first addresses which graduate employment outcomes should 
qualify for purposes of an employment outcome standard. It then sets out a 
draft proposed standard. 
A. Ascertaining the Employment Outcomes that Qualify for Purposes of the Standard
In his article addressing whether trends in the entry-level legal employment 
market reflect structural or merely cyclical changes, Professor Bernard Burk 
proposed the following definition of “law jobs”: 
those placements that someone would, ex ante, rationally plan to attend law 
school to obtain. This should include only placements for which a law degree 
is typically a necessary or extremely valuable substantive preparation (as 
opposed to being merely useful or relevant); or put slightly differently, the 
law degree must provide dramatic and substantial advantages in obtaining 
or performing the job not more easily obtainable or substitutable (whether in 
nature or extent) another way.129 
Because this definition centers on the reasonable expectations of rational 
law school applicants, it is also the appropriate definition for the purpose 
of determining which employment outcomes qualify for purposes of an 
employment outcome standard. A school fulfills the promise of the J.D. 
program when its graduate employment outcomes align with the objectives of 
the program—to prepare students for employment in available jobs for which 
the degree is “necessary or extremely valuable.”130 
Next is a question of whether the current ABA employment data reporting 
regime, which is designed for disclosure of employment outcomes for use 
128. See infra note 13, and accompanying text.
129. Burk, supra note 3, at 547. Professor Burk further explains that this definition of “law jobs” 
is objective, focusing on the ordinary rational person and not taking into account any 
idiosyncratic reasons for going to law school; omits any “hedonic component” as to whether 
a job is desirable or fulfilling; and omits any “economic component,” i.e., any threshold 
amount of compensation; see also Kyle P. McEntee & Derek M. Tokaz, Take This Job and Count 
It, 2 J. leg. meTricS 309, 315-16 (2012) (describing Law School Transparency’s Law School 
Score Reports on law school employment outcomes; “start[ing] with the conventional 
assumption that the bulk of people attend law school aiming to pursue a career practicing 
law.”).
130. As discussed above, the primary purpose of the ED regulation requiring accrediting agencies 
to have student outcomes standards is to ensure that students realize the promise of the 
degree program. See supra notes 65-67, and accompanying text.
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by the reasonable law school applicant, is appropriate for purposes of an 
employment rate standard.131 Does the ABA Employment Questionnaire 
produce the data necessary to accurately ascertain the extent to which law 
schools are placing students in qualifying jobs? Further, is ten months after 
graduation an appropriate measuring point? On the first question, as will be 
seen below, applying Professor Burk’s qualitative definition of “law jobs” to the 
quantitative data collected through the employment questionnaire proves to 
be a somewhat awkward exercise, but it nevertheless produces a substantively 
accurate measure of employment rates in qualifying jobs at ten months after 
graduation. Indeed, given that qualifying employment should be defined by 
reference to the reasonable expectations of a rational law school applicant, the 
ABA’s current employment data reporting regime produces a good measure 
of entry-level qualifying employment rates precisely because it is designed to 
produce employment outcome information that is “complete, accurate and 
not misleading to a reasonable law school student or applicant.”132 
On the second question, the ten-month measuring point obviously does 
not capture longer-term employment outcomes. It is premised on the fact that 
July bar examination results are released between October and December 
depending on the state, and many employers do not make hiring decisions 
until bar passage is assured. It is only a snapshot, and one that is taken at the 
point of entry into the profession. It may say little about the value of the degree 
over the course of a graduate’s career.133 However, a number of considerations 
support using the ten-month measuring point that has traditionally been 
used for the disclosure of employment outcomes for an employment outcome 
standard. The definition of qualifying employment, based on the reasonable 
expectations of a typical law school applicant, strongly implies a job obtained 
shortly after graduating and taking a bar examination, if not before the first 
student loan payments will come due. Moreover, it would be much more 
difficult and expensive to track outcomes at two or more years after graduation, 
and these data likely would be less complete than what schools can collect 
relatively soon after graduation. Finally, there is no reason to think that 
schools’ longer-term employment outcomes are not closely correlated with the 
outcomes at ten months after graduation. As discussed more fully below,134 
131. Professor Burk undertook this same analysis for the purpose of evaluating trends in the 
entry-level legal employment market. See Burk, supra note 3, at 564-71. My analysis tracks his 
in most but not all respects, but with the different purpose of implementing a minimum 
employment rate accreditation standard for the future.
132. See Standard 509(a), ABA Standards, supra note 14, at 35. 
133. See Burk, supra note 3, at 546 (“Focusing on entry-level employment truncates the inquiry 
more or less at the first job a graduate obtains out of law school. Such a focus may tell us 
little about the course lawyers’ career paths may follow as they advance from there, and 
thus will not be as informative as we might like about the state or evolution of the legal 
employment market overall.”); see also Simkovic & McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 
supra note 3 (finding that starting salary is not a good predictor of earnings later in a law 
graduate’s career).
134. See infra notes 154-160, and accompanying text.
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the key is to set an employment rate that accounts for an appropriate level of 
graduate legal employment ten months after graduation. 
The ABA Employment Questionnaire has eleven categories of employment 
status: Employed—Bar Passage Required (BPR); Employed—J.D. Advantage 
(JDA); Employed—Professional Position; Employed— Nonprofessional 
Position; Employed—Law School/University Funded; Employed—
Undeterminable; Pursuing Graduate Degree Full Time; Unemployed—Start 
Date Deferred; Unemployed—Not Seeking; Unemployed—Seeking; and 
Employment Status Unknown. All employment must be reported as either 
long term (LT) or short term (ST), and as either full time (FT) or part time 
(PT). In addition, employment type must be reported. The employment types 
are: Law Firms (Solo, 2-10, 11-25, 26-50, 51-100, 101-250, 251-500, 501+, Unknown 
Size); Business & Industry; Government; Public Interest; Clerkships—Federal; 
Clerkships—State & Local; Clerkships—Other; Education; Employer Type 
Unknown.135
Initially, the categories “Employed—Professional Position,” “Employed—
Nonprofessional Position,” “Employed—Law School/University Funded,” 
and “Employed—Undeterminable,” as well as short-term positions, can be 
quickly excluded from the definition of qualifying employment for purposes 
of an employment rate standard. Very few law students enter law school for 
the purpose of obtaining nonlegal, temporary, or part-time employment.136 
Part-time employment also should probably be excluded from the definition 
of qualifying employment, although there is room for argument that graduates 
who take long-term, part-time, BPR or JDA positions have achieved for the 
time being what they expected in coming to law school. Some number of 
graduates no doubt prefer part-time employment due to a variety of reasons, 
including family commitments or health concerns. For the graduating Class of 
2017, 642 or 1.8% of graduates had part-time, long-term, BPR or JDA positions 
at ten months after graduation (282 BPR and 360 JDA).137 The disparity in the 
numbers and percentages of such jobs reported by individual schools implies 
a degree of uncertainty about how the long-term classification is being used. 
The median number of graduates reported in LT, PT, BPR jobs was 1, but 
the number ranged from 0 to 7 and the percentage ranged from 0 to 10.2% 
of the graduating class. Similarly, the median number of graduates reported 
in LT, PT JDA positions was 1, while the number ranged from 0 to 11 and the 
percentage from 0 to 7.2%. 
135. The ABA Employment Questionnaire and accompanying Definitions and Instructions 
are available at: http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
questionnaire.html.
136. Accord Burk, supra note 3, at 560; McEntee & Tokaz, supra note 129, at 316-317; Campos, supra 
note 3, at 198 (2012) (“[A] real legal job consists of full-time, non-temporary employment 
that requires a law degree . . . . [I]t is safe to assume that very few people spend $150,000 to 
$250,000 in order to qualify for part-time or temporary work.”).
137. ABA Section of Legal Education, Employment Summary Report, Compilation—All Schools 
Data (2017), http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org (columns D, I, and AK).
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Likewise, solo practice jobs probably should not be considered qualifying 
employment for purposes of an employment outcome standard. Again, very 
few law students enter law school with the objective of setting up a solo practice 
right out of law school. As Professor Burk writes, 
very few law students are realistically prepared to practice without more 
experienced supervision on the day they pass the bar exam (let alone have 
clients to practice on). Moreover, solo practice straight out of school is strongly 
negatively correlated with school prestige, suggesting that this placement is 
chosen disproportionately by those with few alternatives. The category is also 
subject to reporting abuse, because a school may be tempted to report its 
unemployed more favorably as self-employed.138 
For the Class of 2017, 393 of 34,923 graduates, or 1.1%, were reported as being 
employed full time and long term as solo practitioners.139 The percentage has 
varied across years, with higher numbers of graduates reported as employed 
in solo practice when the unemployment rate is higher,140 reinforcing the 
conclusion that few students attend law school with the purpose of starting 
their careers in solo practice.
138. Burk, supra note 3, at 560-61; see also McEntee & Tokaz, supra note 129, at 317. Professor 
Campos has argued that, beyond graduates who are employed as solo practitioners, 
many are employed at very small firms whose employment is functionally “unsustainable 
self-employment.” He posits that while some jobs in firms with two to ten attorneys are 
“genuine, if generally low-paying, associate positions with stable law firms,” “others consist[ 
] of nominally paid ‘clerkships’ or so-called eat-what-you-kill arrangements, in which a firm 
offers office space to a graduate in return for a percentage of whatever business the graduate 
manages to drum up. Yet others consist[ ] of a couple of new grads opening a law office and 
trying to make a go of it . . . .” Campos, supra note 3, at 201-02. For the Class of 2017, 14.8% 
of graduates were reported as being employed FT, LT in law firms of two to ten attorneys. 
Based on data published by the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar for the graduating Class of 2017. See Employment Summary ABA 
Questionnaire, supra note 25.
139. ABA Section of Legal Education, Employment Summary Report, Compilation—All Schools 
Data (2017), http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org (column BK). The number 
of FT, LT solo practitioners reported by schools for the Class of 2017 ranged from 0 to 15. 
The 25th percentile was zero, the median was one, and the 75th percentile was three. The 
schools with the highest numbers of solo practitioners were all lower-tier schools.
140. See James G. Leipold & Judith N. Collins, The Stories Behind the Numbers: Jobs for New Grads Over 
More Than Two Decades, nAlp (Dec. 2016), http://www.nalp.org/1216research (observing that 
the graduating classes of 2012 and 2013 “with the overall lowest employment rates (and the 
two largest classes to ever move through the American legal education pipeline) secured the 
largest number of jobs in Small Law of any classes ever;” and explaining that: 
[i]t was not necessarily because Small Law was thriving in the aftermath of the 
recession, but faced with a dearth of opportunities at larger law firms, many graduates 
created opportunities for themselves in small law firms out of necessity. For the Class 
of 2015, about 1,400 fewer Small Law jobs were secured compared with 2012 and 2013, 
and the numbers of jobs in the smallest law firms now look very similar to what they 
were before the recession. As Big Law opportunities increased by about 1,300 over that 
period, Small Law jobs secured decreased by about 1,400, even as the graduating class 
size fell somewhat precipitously.
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Graduates who are “Unemployed—Seeking” obviously must be excluded 
from qualifying employment outcomes and included in the number of 
graduates in calculating a law school’s employment rate. Similarly, graduates 
who are “Unemployed—Start Date Deferred” should not be counted. There 
are very few of these graduates (293, or 0.08% of the Class of 2017141), and it is 
inevitable that a few graduates will obtain employment shortly after the status 
determination date no matter what it is.142 
Graduates reported “Unemployed—Not Seeking” and “Employment 
Status Unknown” raise interesting questions. Where graduates are not seeking 
employment, or their employment status is unknown, these outcomes are not 
necessarily negative. Nationally, these categories comprise a fairly small fraction 
of all employment outcomes, 948 graduates, or 2.7% of the Class of 2017.143 
However, appreciable numbers of graduates at a few schools are reported in 
these categories.144 It is fair to assume that a large proportion of graduates who 
are not seeking employment or whose status is unknown do not have positive 
employment prospects or outcomes.145 The schools that report the highest 
percentages of graduates as Employment Status Unknown are all lowest-tier 
schools.146 Moreover, these categories may be subject to manipulation, so 
that including them in the calculation of a school’s legal employment rate is 
necessary to help assure the integrity of the reported data.147 
141. ABA Section of Legal Education, Employment Summary Report, Compilation—All Schools 
Data (2017), http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org (column AG).
142. Also, there is no guarantee that the promised employment will actually materialize, although 
the ABA Employment Questionnaire instructions do require a written offer with a specified 
start date to report a graduate in this category. See EQ Definitions and Instructions, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/questionnaire.html.
143. ABA Section of Legal Education, Employment Summary Report, Compilation—All Schools 
Data (2017), http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org (columns AH and AJ).
144. Eleven schools report ten or more graduates as Employment Status Unknown, comprising 
one third of all graduates reported as such. The median number is one, and the average 
is 2.35. The school reporting the largest percentage of graduates as Employment Status 
Unknown reported twenty-three percent of its graduates as such. 
145. As to Unemployed—Not Seeking, Professor Burk has also noted that “unemployed is 
unemployed, which is not a state of affairs that an ordinary person would rationally plan to 
attend law school to achieve. It seems odd not to count it as such just because the graduate 
has purportedly decided not to try to work at a particular point in time.” Burk, supra note 
3, at 561. Regarding graduates whose employment status is reported as unknown, Professor 
Burk likewise opines that “it stands to reason that [the employment outcomes for these 
graduates] are disproportionately bad; as a practical matter, people with jobs they are proud 
of seem more likely to respond to their schools’ inquiries, and schools seem more likely to 
seek out and report good results.” Id. at 563.
146. Id. at 563 (“Unknown outcomes in a particular school’s graduating class are strongly 
inversely correlated with the school’s prestige, suggesting that more outcomes are likely to 
be reported as unknown by schools having worse employment results overall.”). 
147. Accord id. (“[T]reating unknowns as anything other than not holding a Law Job is an incentive 
for reporting schools to avoid learning (or disclosing) bad news”). 
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Falling between unemployed and employed is “Pursuing Graduate Degree 
Full Time.” This category contains a small proportion of graduates nationally 
and at any individual law school. For the Class of 2017, 550 graduates, or 
1.6%, were reported as Pursuing Graduate Degree Full Time, and the schools 
with the largest numbers comprise an even mix of top fifty and unranked 
schools.148 On the one hand, it might be assumed that graduates who had legal 
employment options would not pursue a graduate degree full time. On the 
other hand, the graduate will normally have started the degree program before 
bar passage results are reported—graduate degree programs typically start in 
the fall semester, so that the graduate who is pursuing a graduate degree full 
time would have started in the fall after May graduation to be reported in this 
category as of March 15 of the year following graduation. These graduates 
therefore should be excluded from the denominator in computing a school’s 
legal employment rate.149 
B. The J.D. Advantage Question
The most difficult call is whether to include JDA positions within the 
definition of qualifying legal employment. Law school is often viewed as a 
“graduate degree in critical thinking” that prepares graduates for a wide range 
of careers beyond the practice of law, even if the typical applicant envisions 
practicing law for at least some stretch of time following graduation. Further, 
it appears that a majority of graduates in JDA positions are not seeking other 
jobs at ten months after graduation,150 suggesting that most are satisfied with 
the utility of their legal education in the position. While this does not establish 
that law students ex ante would rationally decide to attend law school to obtain 
these positions, it does tend to support that proposition. Further, the likelihood 
that some students who matriculated with the intention of obtaining a BPR 
job will develop an interest in JDA employment during the course of their 
legal education should not be ignored. The available data suggest that while 
law school “graduates who practice law earn more than those who do not on 
average,” “law graduates who switch to other occupations when [graduating 
class] cohorts are bigger are not hurt financially.”151
At the same time, there are good reasons to be skeptical of whether most 
jobs classified as JDA jobs are jobs that “someone would, ex ante, rationally 
plan to attend law school to obtain.” As reported in Table 1 above, the number 
and percentage of graduates taking JDA jobs have increased significantly in 
the wake of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, from 2,156 and 4.9% for the 
Class of 2009 to 3,179 and 9.1% for the Class of 2017 (excluding law school-
148. ABA Section of Legal Education, Employment Summary Report, Compilation—All Schools 
Data (2017), http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org (column AF).
149. But see Burk, supra note 3, at 562 (stating that “it appears that many graduates pursuing further 
education are . . . discouraged job-seekers pursuing LLMs in the probably misguided hope 
that it will improve their lot in the job market”).
150. See id. at 557-58.
151. See McIntyre & Simkovic, Timing Law School, supra note 3, at 290.
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funded positions).152 The size and timing of the increase strongly suggest 
that some graduates are taking JDA jobs because BPR jobs are not available. 
This is generally confirmed by the fact that lower-tier law schools generally 
report higher percentages of graduates in JDA positions, and further by the 
NALP data that forty-three percent of graduates in JDA jobs were looking for 
other employment, compared with fifteen percent of graduates in BPR jobs.153 
Indeed, the definition of JDA positions in large part describes employment 
for which one-year postbaccalaureate master of laws degrees are designed 
to prepare students.154 Moreover, the definition of JDA is less than precise—
the line between JDA and Other Professional is open to interpretation—and 
therefore reporting is subject to manipulation.155 
On balance, it would be appropriate to count JDA jobs as qualifying 
employment outcomes, provided that the current definition is narrowed to 
eliminate placements for which students would qualify with a master of laws 
degree. It is hard to justify three years of time and expense for a J.D. degree 
where one year for the master’s is sufficient to prepare a student for the job. 
In sum, the existing ABA graduate employment outcome reporting system 
requires schools to collect and report the employment information that is 
relevant to a typical and reasonable law school applicant’s decision to attend 
a law school and allows for the calculation of each law school’s graduate legal 
employment rates in an accurate and workable manner. Consistent with the 
discussion above, the numerator in the calculation would be all FT, LT, BPR 
and JDA jobs, excluding graduates in solo practice positions. The denominator 
152. Interestingly, after nearly doubling from 2,513 in 2008 to 4,814 in 2014, the number of FT, 
LT, JDA jobs has decreased noticeably in each of the past three years, to 3,179 for the Class 
of 2017.
153. See Burk, supra note 3, at 557-58.
154. Professor Burk has observed that:
Recent events illustrate the difficulty of isolating which placements are truly dependent 
enough on the placement value of a law degree to count as Law Jobs. Nearly thirty 
accredited law schools now offer pre-JD one-year master’s degrees in law, many having 
begun lately. One dean explained his program succinctly: Many lawyers work in 
human resources, but you don’t have to have a J.D. . . . . It’s the same thing with 
compliance officers in banks and hospitals. There are all these jobs in law—criminal 
justice jobs, law firm management jobs, consultants—where a J.D. makes no sense but 
some legal training is useful.” However, “the very positions offered to justify a one-
year master’s [degree] ‘where a J.D. makes no sense’—‘human resources,’ ‘compliance 
officers, ‘criminal justice jobs,’ ‘consultants’—are specifically enumerated examples of 
JD Advantage’ positions in the ABA definition.” 
 Id. at 557 (alterations in original).
155. Accord id. at 556 (stating that the JDA category is “subject to opportunism in self-reporting”), 
and 558 (concluding that “while no quantitative precision is possible, . . . it [is] likely that 
at least some of the jobs being reported as JD Advantage or JD Preferred would comprise a 
goal for which someone might rationally seek a law degree, and thus should be counted as 
Law Jobs. But it appears equally likely that quite a few of those placements, and probably 
more of those reported in recent years, should not.”); see also Campos, supra note 3, at 198 
(contending that “a real legal job consists of . . . employment that requires a law degree”).
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would be all graduates, excluding those pursuing a graduate degree full time. 
In general, this formula will yield an employment rate that is very close to the 
same as all FT, LT, BPR and JDA positions (without adjustment) divided by 
all graduates (again, without adjustment). 
C. Guiding Principles for an Employment Outcome Standard 
A law graduate employment outcome standard must serve the purposes 
underlying the ED criterion requiring accreditors to have student outcome 
standards,156 while taking into account that the current ten-month measuring 
point used by the ABA and NALP may obscure longer-term positive outcomes. 
An employment outcome standard must also recognize that economic 
downturns may span several years, and so provide that substandard outcomes 
in a few years would not lead to a loss of accreditation. 
In establishing an employment outcome standard, it is useful to first consider 
what the generally attainable maximum legal employment rate is. About 
twenty percent of graduates do not pass the bar on the first try,157 and a large 
proportion of these graduates may pass the bar on a subsequent attempt and 
therefore not obtain legal employment until after the ten-month measurement 
date. (By the same token, some who do not pass the bar on the first attempt 
nevertheless secure legal employment within ten months of graduation.) In 
addition, some graduates decide to pursue a graduate degree full time even 
though they have the option of legal employment. (As noted above, 1.6% of 
Class of 2017 graduates were pursuing a graduate degree full time at ten months 
after graduation.) Further, a small percentage of graduates likely decide not 
to take legal employment for reasons other than the absence of opportunity 
or are unemployable due to mental health or character and fitness issues, or 
because they interview poorly. Taking account of these factors, it is reasonable 
to estimate that the generally attainable maximum LT, FT, BPR employment 
rate for law graduates ten months after graduation is about seventy-five to 
eighty percent. This estimate is borne out by the employment reports from 
schools with the very highest legal employment rates. At the schools with law 
156. As discussed above, supra notes 12-14 and 62-67, and accompanying text, the primary purpose 
of the ED regulation is to assure that program outcomes align with program objectives, so 
that students realize the promise of the degree program. In addition, the regulation aims to 
prevent unintended subsidies to schools that would arise where graduates are not able to 
obtain jobs that allow them to repay their student loans. 
157. The average first-time bar passage rate for graduates of ABA-approved law schools for the 
years 2007 through 2017 is 80.3. (The National Conference of Bar Examiners web site has 
information on state and overall bar passage rates going back to 2006, however, unlike 
the years 2007 through 2015, the 2006 data does not include a breakdown for graduates of 
ABA-approved law schools.) From 2013 to 2016, the first-time bar pass rate fell from 81% to 
73%, and then rebounded slightly to 75% for 2017. See Statistics, National Conference of Bar 
Examiners, http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F218 (last visited 
May 27, 2018). 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Avg.
82% 85% 83% 81% 82% 79% 81% 77% 74% 73% 75% 80%
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job placement rates in the top decile, slightly more than eighty percent of 
graduates obtained FT, LT, BPR jobs within ten months after graduation.158 
Beyond FT, LT, BPR jobs, some graduates take FT, LT, JDA jobs, either 
by choice or because they do not find acceptable BPR employment (perhaps 
because they did not pass the bar). At the schools with law job placement rates 
in the top decile, about eighty-eight percent obtain FT, LT, BPR and JDA jobs 
combined.159 So, approximately eighty-five percent would be the combined 
maximum attainable FT, LT, BPR and JDA combined employment rate.
The maximum should be discounted to some degree to take account of 
the ten-month measuring point under the ABA’s current employment data 
reporting system. The ten-month measuring point likely obscures a number 
of positive employment outcomes.160 On the one hand, the large majority of 
law students attend law school with an expectation of having a law job within 
ten months of graduation (at least assuming they pass the bar on the first 
attempt), and so no allowance for positive outcomes beyond ten months is 
appropriate given the purpose of the employment rate standard to assure that 
program outcomes align with program objectives. (The fact that about twenty 
percent of graduates do not pass the bar on the first attempt and therefore 
do not land a law job until ten months after graduation is already baked into 
the generally attainable maximum law job placement rate discussed above.) 
Further, employment prospects likely diminish over time after passing the bar, 
and especially when the graduate must compete with the next year’s graduates 
for legal employment. On the other hand, positive outcomes may be delayed 
for a variety of reasons and, regardless of the reason, should be credited to the 
school. 
Recognizing that legal employment rates for some schools could be 
meaningfully higher at two or more years after graduation, an employment 
outcome standard should also give schools the option to demonstrate 
compliance by collecting data at the two- or three-year mark after graduation. 
The burden of collecting data at that point is likely significantly more onerous 
than at ten months after graduation. While it is not necessary to impose such 
a burden on all schools, giving schools that do not meet the standard based 
on the ten-month measuring date an opportunity to show better outcomes at 
158. See supra Table 3.
159. Id. Compare Burk, supra note 3, at 573 (suggesting that “80% may approach the highest level of 
Law-Job employment nine to ten months after graduation that is likely to be achievable in 
the entry-level legal markets of the last thirty years”), with Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 
2010, supra note 3, at 1118 (predicting that law school applicants “will want to see about 85% 
of a school’s graduates practicing law several years after graduation,” taking into account 
the fact that some graduates do not pass the bar on the first attempt and enter the law 
practice later than most).
160. Cf. Life After Law School, supra note 3, at 19 (reporting that “[i]t took 17% of the most recent 
graduates, who graduated between 2010 and 2015, more than a year to find a good job—the 
highest percentage among all generations of graduates.”). Some of the seventeen percent 
presumably had law jobs at ten months after graduation, just not good jobs that they wanted 
to keep.
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two or three years after graduation is appropriate. The minimum rate at two 
or three years after graduation would of course be higher than that set for 
ten months after graduation. (The data submitted by any such schools will 
help the ABA evaluate how well the ten-month rate predicts a higher rate at 
later points in time.) The pending change to the bar passage standard would 
require that seventy-five percent of graduates who took a bar pass it within two 
years of graduation. This standard implies a FT, LT, BPR rate of something 
less than seventy-five percent at two years after graduation.
Given the evidence that JDA jobs are taken by many students because 
BPR jobs are not available, an employment outcome standard might also 
limit the percentage of JDA positions that can be counted toward meeting the 
standard. In any event, the ABA’s definition of JDA jobs should be revised to 
exclude jobs for which a one-year postbaccalaureate master’s degree would 
qualify a graduate. As noted, currently law schools on average report about 
nine percent of their graduates in FT, LT, JDA positions.161
Economic downturns may span several years, and employment rates at most 
schools can be expected to decrease in these times. To ensure that a school 
does not lose accreditation when legal employment rates slip temporarily, the 
standard should provide that only persistent failure to meet the minimum will 
affect accreditation. The ED’s gainful employment rule for proprietary and 
trade schools is instructive. It protects schools from “‘unanticipated fluctuations 
in local labor market conditions’” by allowing programs “‘to remain eligible 
[for financial aid] for up to four years,’ which is long enough to survive ‘[m]ost 
economic downturns’ that tend to last around eleven months.”162 
An employment rate standard might also require schools that fall below the 
minimum rate for the first or second time (in consecutive years) to submit a 
realistic plan to reverse the trend before accreditation could be removed after 
four years of failing to meet the standard. In this way, schools that do not have 
a viable plan for maintaining compliance with the standard can be dealt with 
before the day of noncompliance inevitably arrives.
The features of an employment rate standard mentioned so far relate to the 
primary purpose of the ED regulation requiring program outcome standards, 
that program outcomes align with program objectives. As to the subsidiary 
purpose of the regulation, to help ensure that graduates are in a position to 
repay their loans in full, the standard might include a provision that makes 
it more difficult for a school with a higher average law school graduate loan 
debt to comply with the standard, and easier for a school with a lower average 
graduate debt amount to comply. 
161. See supra Table 1, and note 152 and accompanying text.
162. Ass’n of Private Section Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 191-92 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(quoting 79 Fed. Reg. 64,926, 64,918), aff’d, 640 Fed. App’x 5, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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VI. A Draft Employment Outcome Standard
Consistent with the above general contours of an employment outcome 
standard, here is a tentative draft standard.
Standard XXX. Graduate Employment Outcomes
(a) A law school must demonstrate that for at least two of the past five 
graduating classes:
 (1) at least sixty percent of the graduates were employed in full-time, 
long-term, bar passage-required or J.D. Advantage jobs as of March 15 
of the year following graduation; or
 (2) at least seventy-five percent of the graduates were employed in full-
time, long-term, bar passage-required or J.D. Advantage jobs as of 
March 15 of the second year following graduation.
 No more than fifteen percent of graduates employed in full-time, long-
term J.D. Advantage jobs may be counted toward the percentage rates 
specified in subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph.
(b) A law school that fails to comply with subsection (a)(1) of this standard 
with respect to any graduating class must promptly submit a detailed 
plan for how it will remain in compliance with the standard.
(c) As used in this standard, 
 (1) “graduating class” is defined as a cohort of graduates who graduated 
between September 1 and August 30 of the following year, and includes 
graduates whose employment status is unknown, but excludes graduates 
who are pursuing a graduate degree full time; and
 (2) the terms “full-time,” “part-time,” “long-term,” “short-term,” “bar 
passage-required,” and “J.D. Advantage” are as defined in the Definitions 
and Instructions accompanying the ABA Employment Questionnaire, 
except, however, that graduates employed as solo practitioners shall 
not be counted as employed.
VII. Conclusion
Over the past seventeen years, the numbers and percentages of law graduates 
obtaining legal employment within nine to ten months after graduation 
have declined, and median entry-level salaries have decreased. During the 
same period, the cost of the J.D. degree at most law schools has increased 
substantially. The graduate employment outcomes at most ABA-accredited 
law schools are robust. However, some schools have been consistently placing 
less than forty percent or fifty percent of their graduates in FT, LT BPR jobs 
within nine to ten months after graduation. At these schools, the graduate 
outcomes do not align with the objectives of the J.D. program—to prepare 
students to pass a bar examination and to participate in the legal profession. 
Moreover, the current admission and bar passage standards do not constrain 
law schools from pursuing admission policies that minimize reduction in 
enrollments without regard to the impact on employment outcomes. Most of 
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the schools with persistently very weak employment outcomes have reduced 
admission criteria as law school applications have declined steeply over the 
past seven years. The predictable result is that bar passage rates have fallen, 
and the schools’ graduates’ employment prospects are further diminished. 
Finally, it appears likely that many graduates at schools with very weak 
legal employment rates are not able to repay their loans, especially when the 
amount borrowed is very high, resulting in an unintended federal taxpayer 
subsidy for the schools. An ABA employment outcome standard will better 
ensure that: law graduates realize the promise of the J.D. program, law schools 
do not pursue admission policies that fail to give due regard to employment 
outcomes, and law schools are not receiving unwarranted taxpayer subsidies.
